Robust digital image watermarking by Zong Tianrui
Robust Digital Image Watermarking
by
Tianrui Zong
M.Sc.
Submitted in fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Deakin University
June 2015


iAcknowledgement
I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor Yong Xiang for his expert supervision
and inspirational guidance at the highest academic level. His continuous encour-
agement and motivation were valuable and essential to my progress in my research
and will deﬁnitely assist me in my future career. Secondly my gratitude is directed
towards Doctor Shang Gao. I am grateful for her supervision and encouragement,
and those invaluable discussions with her.
I would also like to thank my fellow postgraduate colleagues and research fellows
with whom I had the opportunity to interact in a friendly working environment.
I am extremely grateful to Deakin University for its ﬁnancial assistance in the form
of a Deakin University School of IT HDR Scholarship, without which this research
would not have been possible.
Finally, I also wish to thank my parents and friends for their endless love, care
and encouragement.
ii
Abstract
This thesis addresses the problems of digital image watermarking for copyright
protection. Novel rank based, moment based and histogram based image wa-
termarking methods are developed to improve the performance of image water-
marking methods. A post-processing step is also proposed to compensate for the
commonly used Gaussian pre-ﬁltering operation.
Firstly, a rank based image watermarking method with high embedding capacity
is proposed, which is host signal interference (HSI) free and robust against various
attacks, and the parameter selections are analyzed.
Secondly a moment based method is proposed by exploiting the probability density
function (pdf) of the pixel value distribution (PPVD) of the host image to resist
both signal processing attacks and geometric attacks, especially cropping.
Thirdly, a histogram based method is proposed by exploiting the histogram shape
of the host image and introducing an error buﬀer to resist both signal processing
attacks and geometric attacks, especially cropping and random bending attacks
(RBAs).
Finally, the side eﬀect of Gaussian pre-ﬁltering is theoretically analyzed and a post-
processing step, which is called high-frequency component modiﬁcation (HFCM),
is designed to compensate the side eﬀect of Gaussian pre-ﬁltering.
Extensive simulations have been carried out to evaluate and compare the proposed
methods with suitable existing methods.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the fast growth of communication networks and advances in multimedia pro-
cessing technologies, multimedia piracy has become a serious problem. In an open
network environment, digital watermarking is a promising technology to tackle
multimedia data piracy. In digital watermarking, the watermark data (such as
publisher information, user identity, ﬁle transaction/downloading records, etc.)
are hidden into the actual multimedia object without aﬀecting its normal usage.
When necessary, the owners or law enforcement agencies can extract the water-
mark data, by using a secret key, to trace the source of illegal distribution. Apart
from copyright protection digital watermarking is also used for other applications
such as source tracking, broadcast monitoring and temper detection.
While digital watermarking can be applied to various multimedia data such as
audio [1]-[4], image [5]-[8] and video [9]-[12], this thesis focuses on image water-
marking. Compared to an one dimensional audio signal, an image signal has at
least two dimensions. Therefore the attacks on an image are more complicated
1
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and challenging to deal with. Since all the attacks applied to a gray scale image
can also be applied to a color map image, in this thesis the discussions focus on
gray scale images.
1.1 Motivation
Over the last decade, various image watermarking methods have been developed.
These image watermarking methods range from simple low-bit coding to sophisti-
cated algorithm based methods. In order to be used in practical applications, an
image watermarking method should satisfy certain requirements:
• Imperceptibility: The watermark should not aﬀect the perceptual quality
of the original digital media signiﬁcantly, which means one cannot see a
watermark in an image.
• Security: The watermark must be strongly resistant to unauthorized detec-
tion and decoding.
• Robustness: The watermark should be correctly extracted both in with-
attack and without-attack scenarios. The attacks can be categorized as
signal processing attacks, which includes noise addition, common ﬁltering,
amplitude scaling, constant luminance change, histogram equalization and
image compression, and geometric attacks, which contains rotation, scaling
and translation (RST), shearing, aﬃne transforms, cropping and random
bending attacks (RBAs).
• Low computational cost: In many situations, like real-time applications, it
is important to keep the time spent on watermark embedding and detec-
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tion as short as possible, which means the computation cost of an image
watermarking algorithm should also be taken into consideration.
• Adjustability: The imperceptibility, robustness and embedding rate should
be adjustable according to diﬀerent applications.
Various image watermarking methods have been proposed in the past based on
techniques such as, spread spectrum (SS) [13]-[25], quantization [26]-[38], moment
[39]-[41], and histogram [42]-[54]. Inspired by the high embedding capacity of SS
based methods and quantization based methods, in this thesis we ﬁrst propose a
new rank based image watermarking method. Since the detection of the proposed
rank based method solely depends on the ranks of the detection matrices, the
detection performance will not degrade with the increasing of the embedding rate,
which makes the proposed method very eﬀective at high embedding rate. It is also
host signal interference (HSI) free and robust to many attacks such as amplitude
scaling, luminance change, noise addition and image compression.
We then study the moment based image watermarking methods, which are gen-
erally robust to many attacks but vulnerable to cropping. We develop a novel
moment based method to overcome this problem of the existing moment based
methods. The cropping attack that we considered in this thesis removes a certain
percentage of the outer parts of an image without changing its aspect ratio. Since
the cropping eﬀect is based on the nature of an image, the methods we proposed
to combat cropping attack are not absolutely invariant but approximately invari-
ant to cropping. Nevertheless, they are eﬀective enough against cropping. This is
discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
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We also investigate the drawbacks of the existing histogram based image water-
marking methods. We proposed a histogram based method which explicitly ex-
ploits the histogram shape to improve the robustness and imperceptibility of the
existing histogram based methods.
To combat the side eﬀect of the commonly used Gaussian pre-ﬁltering operation,
through theoretical analysis we design a post-processing step, which is called high-
frequency component modiﬁcation (HFCM). The proposed HFCM can compensate
for the negative impact of Gaussian pre-ﬁltering hence signiﬁcantly improving the
robustness.
1.1.1 Rank based image watermarking
Many applications only consider common signal processing attacks and request
high embedding capacity, like broadcasting. Compared to other watermarking
schemes, the watermarking methods based on SS and quantization can normally
achieve higher embedding capacity under given imperceptibility and robustness.
However, the SS based methods suﬀer from HSI. Although many eﬀorts have been
done to combat this problem, HSI still cannot be completely removed. The quanti-
zation based methods do not have the HSI issue, but they suﬀer from the amplitude
scaling attack. Moreover, as the embedding rate increases, the performance of both
SS based methods and quantization based methods deteriorates dramatically. In
order to make an image watermarking method robust to amplitude scaling attack,
the detection process should not be aﬀected by proportional modiﬁcation to the
host image. If the algorithm is HSI free, the detector should be designed in such a
way that the host image should not be treated as noise at the detection stage. The
algorithm should also separate the embedding and detection processes for diﬀerent
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watermark bit to make it eﬀective at high embedding capacity. To meet all these
requirements, in this paper we propose a novel rank based image watermarking
method.
In the watermark embedding process, the host image is divided into blocks, fol-
lowed by 2-D discrete cosine transform (DCT). For each image block, a secret key
is employed to randomly select a set of DCT coeﬃcients suitable for watermark
embedding. Watermark bits are inserted into an image block by modifying the
set of DCT coeﬃcients using a rank based embedding rule. In the watermark
detection process, the corresponding detection matrices are formed from the re-
ceived image using the secret key. Afterwards, the watermark bits are extracted
by checking the ranks of the detection matrices. Since the proposed watermarking
method only uses two DCT coeﬃcients to hide one watermark bit, it can achieve
very high embedding capacity. Moreover, our method is free of HSI. This desired
feature and the usage of an error buﬀer in watermark embedding result in high
robustness against attacks. The proposed method outperforms the latest works
by large margins when the embedding capacity is high.
1.1.2 Moment based image watermarking
There are many applications which may suﬀer from not only signal processing at-
tacks, but also geometric attacks, like printing and scanning. The moment based
methods provide a solution to these applications. The second part of the thesis
addresses the problems in existing moment based image watermarking methods.
By exploiting the aﬃne geometric moment invariants, Alghoniemy and Tewﬁk pro-
posed a watermarking scheme which modiﬁes the moment invariants into a pre-
deﬁned interval [39] in order to tackle RST. With the use of image normalization,
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Dong et al. proposed a scheme by using geometric moments and the corresponding
central moments in [40]. This scheme can resist aﬃne transforms. In [41], the or-
thogonal Legendre moment invariant was employed to cope with aﬃne attacks. In
general, moment based schemes are robust to signal processing attacks and aﬃne
attacks. However, they are highly vulnerable to cropping attack. Speciﬁcally, the
moment invariants can be badly distorted if part of the image is cut because the
moment invariants are extracted from all pixels.
In this thesis, we modify the moment based approach to deal with cropping attack.
Firstly, we extract the probability density function (pdf) of the pixel value distri-
bution (PPVD) from the original image. Secondly, we reshape and normalize the
PPVD to form a two dimensional image. Then, the moment invariants are calcu-
lated from the PPVD image. Since PPVD is insensitive to cropping, the proposed
method is robust to cropping attack. Besides, it also has high robustness against
other common attacks. Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate
the eﬀectiveness of the proposed method.
1.1.3 Histogram based image watermarking
The proposed moment based method is a one-bit watermarking method. In many
scenarios, more watermark bits need to be embedded as well as the robustness
against both signal processing attacks and geometric attacks. Histogram based
methods seem to be a good solution to these applications. The third part of the
thesis investigates the problems in existing histogram based image watermarking
methods. Since the histogram is a spatial statistic of an image, it is invariant to
pixels position shifting and insensitive to cropping, thus having potential to be
exploited to tackle cropping attack and RBAs. Recently, the histogram shape is
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utilized in [48]-[50] to develop robust image watermarking methods against geo-
metric attacks. However, since the method in [49] does not consider the impacts of
signal processing attacks and interpolation errors caused by geometric attacks, it is
sensitive to many attacks. In [50], the histograms are constructed from the spatial
feature regions, which reduces the sample space and stability of histograms. In
addition, in methods [48]-[50], histograms are constructed according to the mean
value of the host image. As a result, the pixel groups in these methods are selected
based on the proximity of their pixel values to the mean value, rather than the
numbers of pixels they contain. In other words, the pixel groups which contain
more pixels are not formed and utilized for watermark embedding. Therefore, the
pixel group selection algorithm used by these methods compromises their robust-
ness. Moreover, the histogram based methods lack of security.
We propose a novel image watermarking method that explicitly exploits the his-
togram shape of the host image. In the embedding process, we ﬁrst pre-process the
host image by a Gaussian low-pass ﬁlter. Then a secret key is used to randomly
select a number of gray levels and the histogram of the ﬁltered image with respect
to these selected gray levels is constructed. After that, a histogram-shape-related
index is introduced to choose the pixel groups with the highest number of pixels
and a safe band is built between the chosen and non-chosen pixel groups. A wa-
termark embedding scheme is proposed to insert watermarks into the chosen pixel
groups. The usage of the histogram-shape-related index and safe band results in
good robustness. The use of secret key provides security. At the decoding end,
based on the available secret key, the watermarked pixel groups are identiﬁed and
watermarks are extracted from them. Compared to the existing histogram based
methods, the proposed method is more robust to attacks, more secure and has
higher imperceptibility.
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1.1.4 Design of a post-processing step
The fourth part of the thesis analyzes the side eﬀect of the commonly used Gaus-
sian pre-ﬁltering and designs a post-processing step to compensate the negative
impact. The use of Gaussian ﬁlter for robust feature extraction is not unusual in
image watermarking. Since the Gaussian kernel is isotropic and circular in shape,
in [55] and [56] it is utilized to extract the rotation invariants. In [57], Lu et al.
used Gaussian ﬁlter to ﬁnd image meshes for watermarking. Xiang et al. [48] ap-
plied Gaussian ﬁltering to the host image to obtain the low-frequency component,
which is resistance to the interpolation errors during geometric attacks, additive
noise, common compression and ﬁltering operations. However, the side eﬀect of
the Gaussian pre-ﬁltering is not considered in [57]. In [48], a post-processing step
is proposed to combat the side eﬀect. Since the post-processing step in [48] is not
designed based on the mechanism of Gaussian ﬁltering, it is not eﬀective.
In this thesis, we design a post-processing step to compensate the side eﬀect of
the Gaussian pre-ﬁltering, which is called HFCM. We ﬁrst introduce the necessity
of HFCM. Then the theoretical analysis is performed to show the mechanism of
Gaussian ﬁltering and the side eﬀect of Gaussian pre-ﬁltering on the existing wa-
termarking methods. After that, the implementation of HFCM is explained and a
proper strength of HFCM is discussed. The eﬀectiveness of HFCM is demonstrated
by simulations.
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1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 presents the literature review of the existing image watermarking meth-
ods. The drawbacks of the existing image watermarking methods are also dis-
cussed.
Chapter 3 proposes a new rank based method which uses the DCT coeﬃcients
modiﬁcation. This method is robust against signal processing attacks and has
high embedding capacity.
Chapter 4 addresses the vulnerability of moment based methods towards cropping
attack. A new moment based method using PPVD is also proposed to combat
cropping attack.
Chapter 5 proposes a histogram based method which explicitly exploits the his-
togram shape to resist various attacks including cropping and RBAs.
Chapter 6 analyzes the side eﬀect of Gaussian pre-ﬁltering and proposes a post-
precessing step, which is called HFCM, to compensate the Gaussian pre-ﬁltering.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with possible future research directions in image
watermarking area.
1.3 Contributions
The original contributions of this thesis are listed as follows:
1. This thesis proposes a new rank based method which uses DCT coeﬃcients
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modiﬁcation. Due to the usage of the rank based embedding algorithm and
an error buﬀer, the proposed method can achieve high embedding capacity
and is eﬀective against various attacks.
2. In this thesis, the PPVD from the original image is calculated and the PPVD
image is constructed correspondingly. Then the moment based watermark
embedding is implemented on PPVD image rather than the host image to
achieve high robustness against cropping.
3. After investigating the drawbacks of the existing histogram based methods,
this thesis proposes a histogram based method which explicitly exploits the
histogram shape. With an introduced buﬀer and a secret key, this method
is not only robust against various attacks including cropping and RBAs, but
also secure.
4. This thesis analyzes the side eﬀect of Gaussian per-ﬁltering and proposes a
post-processing step, which is called HFCM, to compensate the side eﬀect of
Gaussian pre-ﬁltering. A proper strength of HFCM is also suggested.
5. Superior performance of the proposed algorithms are shown by the compar-
isons with recent image watermarking methods.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The previous chapter brieﬂy introduced the problems of image watermarking and
outlined the motivation and the structure of the thesis. This chapter presents the
basic concepts of image watermarking and reviews some of the existing popular
watermarking methods.
Last two decades, interest in information hiding has increased. The main driving
force is fear of the erosion of digital copyright. All the works available in digital
form, like audio, image and video, can be perfectly copied and even manipulated
without authorization. This is a great threat to the music, photography, motion
pictures, book, and software publishing industries. Martin Scorsese’s biographical
ﬁlm on white-collar criminal Jordan Belfort was illegally downloaded 30.0 mil-
lion times in 2014 [58]. Meanwhile, piracy-tracking ﬁrm Excipio determined that
“Game of Thrones” was pirated 3.5 million times only through P2P ﬁle-sharing
sites in a 24-hour period [59]. International federation of the phonographic indus-
try (IFPI) [60] ﬁgured out that 95% of the music downloads are illegal [61] in its
11
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 12
Digital Music 2009 report. Moreover, these copyright infringements have caused
severe economic problems. According to the institute for policy innovation (IPI),
about US$17 billion and 70,000 jobs are lost every year due to piracy, which is
deﬁnitely a factor causing our poor economy [62]. Considering the Australian case,
between Aug 2009 and Jul 2010, due to movie piracy an AU$1.37 billion in revenue
loss is mentioned by a study which was released by Ipsos and Oxford Economics
on behalf of Australian federation against copyright theft (AFACT) in February
2011 [63]. Additional to this, 6100 jobs were lost and a loss of AU$193 million in
tax was caused by movie piracy during this period. Another study in 2011 also
estimated that piracy can cost Australian right holders AU$1.4 billion annually
[64]. Therefore people are aware of the importance of copyright protection and
they have started researches to overcome the technological problems.
2.1 Copyright Protection Applications
In the old days encryption was a popular method for copyright protection. At the
encryption process a secret key is involved which allows only the one with the secret
key to decrypt the multimedia object. It is mentioned in a report of the computer
security institute (CSI) in 2007 that 71% of companies surveyed utilized encryption
for some of their data in transit, and 53% utilized encryption for some of their data
in storage [65]. The main drawback of encryption is that if someone buys a secret
key and decrypts the media, then this decrypted ready-to-use version can be copied
and transmitted without authorization. To solve this problem, publishers generally
insert their copyright information like their name, logo and ID into the header of
a multimedia object. However, with the development of technology, nowadays
even a normal person can easily modify or delete the information stored in the
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header ﬁle by using some low cost, sometimes even free, signal processing tools.
One of the ﬁrst tools of copyright protection for digital audio tapes is proposed by
Sony and Phillips, which is called serial copy management system (SCMS) [66].
By using this mechanism, consumers can make digital audio tapes of their own
compact discs (CDs), but they are not able to copy a tape from others tapes. This
is achieved by introducing a Boolean marker in the header of each audio object.
However, this limitation can only be applied for the ﬁrst generation. As digital
versatile disc (DVD) getting popular, another mechanism for copyright protection
is introduced, where the consumers can freely record the videos and TV programs
for personal use using the DVD players, but cannot copy them for the commercial
piracy. In this mechanism, videos will be unmarked, or marked as ‘never copy’
or ‘copy once only’. A video marked as ’never copy’ cannot be recorded and the
video marked as ‘copy once only’ would change its mark to ‘never copy’ after being
recorded once [67], [68].
Although these kinds of schemes were widely adopted in the early stage, they
do have several drawbacks. Firstly, they rely on the tamper-resistance of con-
sumer electronics [69]. The tamper-resistance mechanisms are not sophisticated
and may allow oﬀenders to copy everything perfectly. The SCMS proposed by
Sony and Phillips ﬁnally failed because some hardware manufacturers did not en-
force it. Secondly, for applications like digital libraries where ‘fair use’ provisions
are strongly entrenched, it is not practical to implement electronic copyright man-
agement schemes. It is also argued that a strict level of piracy will constraint the
proﬁts of industries such as software, because before buying many people would
like to try out software they have borrowed from a friend [70]. Considering all
the above-mentioned reasons and possible leaks in the primary copyright protec-
tion mechanisms, some independent secondary mechanisms that can be used to
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trace and prove ownership of digital media should be introduced. Digital marking
therefore is proposed.
In the digital marking mechanisms, copyright information is hidden inside the mul-
timedia object itself rather than the header ﬁle, which results in a high diﬃculty to
extract, alter or delete the copyright information by an oﬀender without degrading
the perceptual quality of the original media piece signiﬁcantly. Since digital mark-
ing schemes do not need any hardware to enforce it at the consumers’ end, they
are also independent from the primary copyright protection mechanisms. Digital
marking can be basically divided into two groups: ﬁngerprints and watermarks.
A digital ﬁngerprint is a serial number which can be used to identify and trace
the copyright oﬀender, while a digital watermark is a copyright message which
can provide some of the evidence needed to prosecute the violators. Digital wa-
termarking has now been widely implemented in many areas such as broadcast
monitoring and passing information through legacy systems [71].
2.2 Introduction to Digital Image Watermarking
A general image watermarking scheme can be segmented into two stages: em-
bedding phase and detection phase. Both embedding and detection phases are
illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
According to the watermark types, watermarking methods can be grouped as
fragile watermarking [72]-[74] and robust watermarking [5]-[8]. For fragile water-
marking some parts of the watermark will be removed or altered if the host signal
is tempered. This scheme is mainly used for temper detection and host signal
recovery, such as to prove the ﬁlm has not been tampered or recover a tempered
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a typical image watermarking process.
evidence photo for prosecuting. The watermarks used in robust watermarking have
a certain level of resistance to attacks, which means they cannot be easily deleted
or modiﬁed unless the perceptual quality of the host signal is signiﬁcantly de-
graded. Compared to fragile watermarking, robust watermarking is more suitable
for copyright protection since the copyright information can be better preserved
in robust watermarking. At the embedding phase of robust watermarking, the
copyright information will be transferred into a watermark sequence and embed-
ded into the host image with an acceptable perceptual quality. Since both of the
watermark embedding and detection algorithms must be open, to ensure that the
watermark will not be decoded, tempered and removed by an unintended oﬀender,
a secret key should be involved at the embedding phase for security concern. One
basic tradeoﬀ in watermark embedding stage is between the perceptual quality and
robustness. A higher watermark strength can bring a better resistance towards
attacks, meanwhile it causes more modiﬁcations on the host image hence degrades
the perceptual quality. The perceptual quality distortion caused by watermark
embedding can be evaluated by objective methodologies such as peak signal to
noise ratio (PSNR) index and structural similarity (SSIM) index [75], [76]. As the
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most widely used perceptual quality measurement, PSNR can be formulated as
PSNR = 10 log10
MAX2
MSE
(2.1)
where MAX is the maximum possible pixel value of the image and MSE is the mean
squared error. The embedding algorithm is also expected to be computationally
eﬃcient and ﬂexible in order to be implemented in real world applications.
Detection phase is another key part for a watermarking scheme. Referring to the
extra information needed in the detection process, watermarking methods can be
classiﬁed as non-blind [77]-[79], semi-blind [80]-[82] and blind [5]-[8] watermarking
schemes. For a non-blind watermarking method, the whole unmarked host image
is needed for the extraction of the mark. While for a semi-blind watermarking
scheme, during the decoding process some extra information is needed from the
original host signal, such as instantaneous frequency and embedded slots. On
the other hand, the detection process of a blind watermarking scheme does not
need any information from the unmarked host signal to extract the watermark.
Comparing all these three kinds of watermarking schemes, due to the restriction
on the information can be gained at the detection end, the practical value of blind
watermarking scheme is much higher than the semi-blind and non-blind ones. The
eﬀectiveness of a detector can be evaluated by the bit error rate (BER) index,
which also reﬂects the robustness of a image watermarking method.
In the remaining part of this chapter we will review some of the most popular
techniques used in image watermarking methods in the literature and their draw-
backs.
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2.3 SS Based Image Watermarking Methods
SS based image watermarking method [13]-[25] is one of the most popular methods
in image watermarking. The idea of SS base watermarking originated from Cox’s
pioneer work [13]. To brieﬂy introduce the idea of SS based image watermarking,
we consider the conventional additive SS watermarking method. A general model
of SS watermark embedding is shown in Fig. 2.2.
<ĞǇƐŝŐŶĂů
tĂƚĞƌŵĂƌŬ ,ŽƐƚŝŵĂŐĞ
ƐŝŐŶĂů
tĂƚĞƌŵĂƌŬĞĚ
ŝŵĂŐĞƐŝŐŶĂů
Figure 2.2: General model of SS watermark embedding.
Let wL be the watermark bit embedded into the host signal and wL ∈ {−1,+1}.
It is assumed that the host signal xL = [xL1 , x
L
2 , ..., x
L
NL ]
T follows Gaussian inde-
pendent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) with zero mean and variance σ2xL , where
superscript T denotes transpose operation and NL is the length of the host signal.
A key signal sL = [sL1 , s
L
2 , ..., s
L
NL ]
T is employed to make the watermarking method
secure and sLi ∈ {−1,+1}, i = 1, 2, ..., NL. By using SS watermark embedding,
the watermarked signal yL = [yL1 , y
L
2 , ..., y
L
NL ]
T can be expressed as
yLi = x
L
i + s
L
i A
LwL , i = 1, 2, ..., NL (2.2)
where AL > 0 is the amplitude factor controlling the watermark strength. The
distortion DL caused by watermark embedding can be formulated as
DL = ‖yL − xL‖. (2.3)
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where ‖.‖ stands for the Euclidean norm. A general model of SS watermark
decoding is shown for without attack scenario in Fig. 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: General model of SS watermark decoding.
Since the host signal is assumed to follow i.i.d., the optimum decoder is to calculate
the correlation between the received data and key signal. Without attacks, the
watermark bit is estimated by the optimum decoder as
wˆL = sign{zL} (2.4)
where
zL =
(
yL
)T
sL (2.5)
and
sign{zL} =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
+1 if zL > 0
0 if zL = 0
−1 if zL < 0.
(2.6)
Given wL = +1 and wL = −1, the pdfs of zL can be determined as follows:
fZ(z
L|{wL = +1}) = N (NLAL, NLσ2xL) (2.7)
fZ(z
L|{wL = −1}) = N (−NLAL, NLσ2xL). (2.8)
For a successful detection of a watermark bit, zL should be positive when wL = +1
and zL should be negative when wL = −1. From the above pdfs, it is clear that the
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SS based image watermarking cannot guarantee 100% detection rate even without
any attacks. This is mainly caused by the HSI, which means the host signal
itself is treated as noise at the decoding stage hence degrading the performance
of detection. Besides, the ﬁnite length of the key signal also aﬀects the detection
performance of the SS based image watermarking method.
In order to reduce the HSI, Malvar et al. proposed a improved SS (ISS) method
in [15] to modulate the energy of the inserted watermark to compensate for the
HSI. In ISS, the watermark embedding procedure is modiﬁed as
yL = xL + sLALwL − λSsL (sL)T xL (2.9)
where λS is a parameter to be calculated.
Even though SS based image watermarking methods are very popular in the lit-
erature, they cannot completely remove the HSI, which deteriorates their perfor-
mance dramatically with the rise of embedding rate. In addition, these methods
are vulnerable to multiple watermark embedding applications. Multiple water-
mark embedding uses the same algorithm but diﬀerent key signals and watermark
sequences to embed multiple watermarks on the host signal. As a consequence,
multiple watermarks increase the interference level at the decoder. Furthermore,
in general SS methods are also vulnerable to watermark estimation attacks.
Apart from time domain, SS technique can be also applied into transform domains
such as fast fourier transform (FFT) domain [21], DCT domain [22], [23], discrete
wavelet transform (DWT) domain [24] and compressed domain [25]. While the
transform domains have certain advantages over time domain, the coeﬃcients used
for watermarking should be carefully chosen to handle the compression attacks and
perceptual quality degradation.
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2.4 Quantization Based Image Watermarking
Methods
In quantization based watermarking methods [26]-[38], features are extracted from
the host image and quantized to the lattice points to embed the watermark se-
quences. These methods are very eﬀective in rate distortion-robustness tradeoﬀs.
The original quantization algorithm utilizes a quantization operation to map a
value to the nearest point belonging to a class of predeﬁned discontinuous points.
The standard quantization operation can be deﬁned as
QL(xLi ,Δ) = round
(
xLi
Δ
)
Δ , i = 1, 2, ..., NL (2.10)
where QL is the quantizer, Δ stands for the step size and round(.) means rounding
a value to the nearest integer.
To embed the watermark bit wL, two quantizers will be needed, namely QL0 for
wL = 0 and QL1 for w
L = 1. Then the watermark embedding equation can be
formulated as
yLi = Q
L
w(x
L
i ,Δ). (2.11)
In [26], Chen and Wornell themselves further extended the basic quantizer into
a dither modulation to deal with quantization noise [27], [28]. The embedding
process of dither modulation can be formulated as
yLi = Q
L(xLi + d
L[i, wL],Δ)− dL[i, wL] , i = 1, 2, ..., NL (2.12)
where
dL[i, 1] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dL[i, 0] + Δ
2
, dL[i, 0] < 0,
dL[i, 0]− Δ
2
, dL[i, 0] > 0,
i = 1, 2, ..., NL (2.13)
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and dL[i, 0] is pseudorandom signal generally chosen as a uniform distribution over
[−Δ
2
, Δ
2
].
To extract the watermark bit wˆL, the detector ﬁrstly embeds the watermark bit
“0” and “1” into the received signal yLi and get z
L(i, 0) and zL(i, 1) respectively,
where
zL(i, 0) = QL(yLi + d
L[i, 0],Δ)− dL[i, 0]; (2.14)
zL(i, 1) = QL(yLi + d
L[i, 1],Δ)− dL[i, 1]. (2.15)
Then by calculating the Euclidean distances between yLi and z
L(i, 0) and yLi and
zL(i, 1) respectively, the watermark bit can be extracted as
wˆL = arg min
wL∈0,1
[
yLi − zL(i, wL)
]2
. (2.16)
The above equation describes the detection process when one bit is embedded in
each sample. In real applications, one bit needs to be embedded spread over NL
samples for many cases. This can be simply achieved by embedding the same
watermark bit wL in all NL samples. One strategy to extract wˆL in this scenario
is to calculate the two Euclidean distances for each bit and take the majority vote
over NL samples. This method is referred as hard-decision detection, which is
given by
wˆL =
⎢⎢⎢⎣ 2
NL + 1
NL∑
i=1
arg min
wL∈0,1
[
yLi − zL(i, wL)
]2⎥⎥⎥⎦ (2.17)
where . represents the ﬂoor function.
Another way of decoding wˆL is called soft-decision detection, which accumulates
the two Euclidean distances over NL samples and then determine wˆL. This can
be expressed as
wˆL = arg min
wL∈0,1
NL∑
i=1
[
yLi − zL(i, wL)
]2
. (2.18)
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Generally speaking, the soft-decision detection usually outperforms the hard-decision
detection [29].
Although many quantization based image watermarking methods use uniform
quantization [30]-[32], it is not optimum when the host signal is not uniformly
distributed. In addition, the uniform quantization is host-independent hence can
be easily estimated and removed. Furthermore, the perceptual characteristics are
not considered in the uniform quantization. As a result, perceptible distortions
can be introduced to some parts of the host signal. Therefore, in [33] a logarithmic
quantization is proposed. In logarithmic quantization the host signal features are
transformed using a logarithmic function and then quantized uniformly in the loga-
rithmic domain. After applying the inverse transform, the quantization is actually
non-uniform in the spatial domain. Although the logarithmic quantization results
in a stronger security and better perceptual quality, as many quantization based
image watermarking methods, it is very vulnerable to amplitude scaling attack.
Amplitude scaling attack is a common attack in image watermarking and can be
easily manipulated, but can severally degrade the detection performance. A lot of
eﬀorts have been done in literature to combat amplitude scaling attack in quanti-
zation based image watermarking. In [34], the Trellis codes are used to tackle the
amplitude scaling attack. Unfortunately, this method does not perform well when
the scaling factor is greater than 1. Shterev and Lagendijk [35] proposed a method
which uses pilot signals to resist amplitude scaling attack, but pilot signals are de-
terministic objects in the host signal and can be easily detected hence removed. In
[36], the dither modulation is combined with Watson’s perceptual model to control
the distortion caused by watermark embedding. The resistance towards amplitude
scaling attack is achieved by adding a term containing the average value of the
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host signal to the Watson’s luminance masking. Although this method shows
good resistance to amplitude scaling attack, since it relies on the average value of
the host signal, it is vulnerable to constant luminance change. Nezhadarya et al.
[37] proposed an image watermarking method based on angle quantization. They
ﬁrst transformed the host signal into the DWT domain, then calculated gradient
vectors for each DWT scale. The gradient vectors were partitioned into blocks
and the gradient vectors with large magnitude, which were referred as signiﬁcant
gradient vectors, of each block were found afterwards. Finally, the watermark bits
were embedded into the angle of the signiﬁcant gradient vectors, which gives the
resistance towards amplitude scaling attack. In this method, the magnitudes of
the gradient vectors were sorted and the vectors with the largest magnitudes were
chosen for watermark embedding. However, when the embedding rate is high,
the gradient vectors without suﬃcient magnitudes have to be selected to embed a
longer watermark sequence. Obviously this will comprise the robustness and limit
the performance.
2.5 Moment Based Image Watermarking
Methods
The image watermarking methods using SS or quantization focus on the robustness
against signal processing attacks. Generally they are not robust against geometric
attacks. To tackle with the geometric invariance problem, geometric moments are
proposed. The geometric moment mLpL,qL of a gray level host image I(uL, vL) is
deﬁned as
mLpL,qL =
∫ ∫
ΓL
upLL v
qL
L I(uL, vL)duLdvL (2.19)
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where ΓL is the support of the host image. The central moments can be therefore
expressed as
μLpL,qL =
∫ ∫
ΓL
(uL − u¯L)pL(vL − v¯L)qLI(uL, vL)duLdvL (2.20)
where u¯L and v¯L are the centroids of the host image and
u¯L =
mL1,0
mL0,0
, v¯L =
mL0,1
mL0,0
. (2.21)
The normalized central moment ηLpL,qL is deﬁned as
ηLpL,qL =
μLpL,qL
(μL0,0)
pL+qL+2
2
. (2.22)
The geometric moment invariants based systems can be designed by two ap-
proaches, which are image normalization technique [39], [83]-[92] and invariant
watermark technique [39]-[41].
2.5.1 Moment based image normalization
Before being applied to image watermarking, the image normalization technique
based on moment invariants was popular in pattern recognition. It is important
for a pattern analysis algorithm to automatically recognize an object in an image
regardless of its position, size, and orientation. They arise in a variety of situations
such as inspection and packaging of manufactured parts [83], classiﬁcation of chro-
mosomes [84], target identiﬁcation [85], [86] and scene analysis [87]. In [88]-[91],
various image normalization methods have been proposed to be invariant to RST.
However, none of them can survive when the image is skewed, which means the
sampling intervals in the vertical direction and the horizontal direction are not
equal. To tackle with the skew operation, in [92] a covariance matrix of the host
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image is ﬁrstly computed. Then the host image is rotated and scaled according to
the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix to obtain its most compact form, which
is invariant to skew operation.
Alghoniemy and Tewﬁk [39] introduced image normalization into the image wa-
termarking. The image normalization in his method is operated before watermark
embedding at the encoder and before watermark detection at the decoder. The
watermark is embedded in the normalized image hence invariant to geometric ma-
nipulations. In [39], the geometric moments μˆLpL,qL are ﬁrstly calculated from the
center of the host image as
μˆLpL,qL =
∫ ∫
ΓL
(uL − uL0)pL(vL − vL0)qLI(uL, vL)duLdvL (2.23)
where (uL0, vL0) is the center of the host image. Since the sign of μˆ
L
1,0 will be
changed by ﬂipping, ﬂipping normalization can be performed by making the nor-
malized image has a predeﬁned sign of μˆL1,0. The scaling invariant, in both even or
not even manners, is achieved by making the normalized image has a predeﬁned
area and unit aspect ratio. No matter how the host image has been scaled, with
the known area and aspect ratio, it is always possible to obtain the normalized im-
age from the scaled image. To make this method rotational invariant, two tensors
tL1 and t
L
2 are deﬁned as
tL1 = μ
L
1,2 + μ
L
3,0, t
L
2 = μ
L
0,3 + μ
L
2,1. (2.24)
Denote the normalized tensors as⎡
⎣tˆL1
tˆL2
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ cosαL sinαL
− sinαL cosαL
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣tL1
tL2
⎤
⎦ (2.25)
where αL is the angle to be determined. By setting tL1 = 0, α
L can be found as
αL = arctan
(
−t
L
1
tL2
)
. (2.26)
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Although the image normalization can achieve the invariance to some geometric
manipulations and has been used in many image watermarking methods, it is
vulnerable to cropping and RBAs. The cropping operation will cause information
loss hence can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the value of the geometric moments. And
the factors of RBAs are very diﬃcult to estimate, therefore the inverse transforms
cannot be implemented properly.
2.5.2 Moment based image watermarking
Apart from the image normalization, the geometric moment invariants can also
be used directly for image watermarking. Alghoniemy and Tewﬁk [39] proposed
a predeﬁned function to modify the value of a combination of geometric moments
into a predetermined value. In this method, the work from Hu [93] has been uti-
lized, where the functions of moments invariant to geometric attacks are developed.
These geometric invariant functions are shown as follows:
ψL1 = η
L
2,0 + η
L
0,2
ψL2 =
(
ηL2,0 − ηL0,2
)2
+ 4
(
ηL1,1
)2
ψL3 =
(
ηL3,0 − 3ηL1,2
)2
+
(
3ηL2,1 − ηL0,3
)2
ψL4 =
(
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
)2
+
(
ηL2,1 + η
L
0,3
)2
ψL5 =
(
ηL3,0 − 3ηL1,2
) (
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
) [(
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
)2 − 3 (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)2]
+
(
3ηL2,1 − ηL0,3
) (
ηL2,1 + η
L
0,3
) [
3
(
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
)2 − (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)2]
ψL6 =
(
ηL2,0 − ηL0,2
) [(
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
)2 − (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)2]+ 4ηL1,1 (ηL3,0 + ηL1,2) (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)
ψL7 =
(
3ηL2,1 − ηL0,3
) (
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
) [(
ηL3,0 + η
L
1,2
)2 − 3 (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)2]
− (ηL3,0 − 3ηL1,2) (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3) [3 (ηL3,0 + ηL1,2)2 − (ηL2,1 + ηL0,3)2] . (2.27)
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Denote f(ψL) as the combination of the ψL1 , ψ
L
2 , . . . , ψ
L
7 . The watermark is then
embedded by extracting ψL1 , ψ
L
2 , . . . , ψ
L
7 from the host image and mapping f(ψ
L)
to a predetermined value HL.
At the detection end, the similar procedure is applied and the combination f ′(ψL)
of the moment invariants from the received image is calculated. If
HL − 	L ≤ f ′(ψL) ≤ HL + 	L (2.28)
where 	L is a small tolerance determined experimentally, the watermark is claimed
as detected. Otherwise, the received image is marked as not watermarked.
It is obvious that the method in [39] can only embed one watermark bit, which
limits its usage in real applications. In [41], Zhang et al. proposed a moment based
image watermarking method eﬀective to aﬃne transforms. The use of Legendre
moments can estimate the parameters of the aﬃne transforms at the detection
stage. Therefore, the inverse transforms can be applied on the received image
hence dramatically increases the embedding capacity compared to [39].
However, same as the image normalization technique, the moment based image
watermarking methods are vulnerable to cropping. Moreover, they also show poor
resistance towards attacks like histogram equalization, which can modify the global
statistics of the host image.
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2.6 Histogram Based Image Watermarking
Methods
The histogram based image watermarking methods [42]-[54] exploit the global
statistics of the host signal. These methods have been presented for the purposes
of robust watermarking [42]-[50] and reversible watermarking [51]-[54]. Among the
methods proposed for robust watermarking, they can be categorized as patchwork
based watermarking [42]-[44] and histogram speciﬁcation based watermarking [45]-
[50].
2.6.1 Patchwork based watermarking methods
The concept of patchwork based image watermarking is initially proposed by Ben-
der et al. [42]. In this algorithm, two sets of features are pseudorandomly selected
from the host signal using a secret key, which are called patches. Then the statis-
tics of both patches (such as mean of a patch) are modiﬁed by the same absolute
amount but opposite signs to embed the watermark bit.
To clarify, denote BL and CL as two patches with NL samples in each patch. In-
crease the sample value bLi in B
L by a small constant δL, where i = 1, 2, ..., NL, and
decrease the sample value cLi in C
L by the same amount δL, where i = 1, 2, ..., NL.
Assume that after modiﬁcation the sample values become b′Li and c
′L
i , which is
b′Li = b
L
i + δ
L
c′Li = c
L
i − δL. (2.29)
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Now deﬁne SL as
SL =
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
(bLi − cLi ). (2.30)
After watermark embedding, SL is modiﬁed as S
′
L, which can be expressed as
S ′L =
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
(b′Li − c′Li )
=
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
(bLi + δ
L − cLi + δL)
=
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
(bLi − cLi ) +
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
2δL
= SL + 2δ
L. (2.31)
Since it has been assumed in [42] that SL = 0, we have
S ′L = 2δ
L. (2.32)
Then by checking the expected S ′L value at the detection stage, the watermark
bit can be extracted. However, due to the limitation of NL in real applications,
the value of SL cannot be guaranteed as 0. Although the distribution of S
′
L is
shifted by 2δL as shown in Fig. 2.4 compared to the distribution of SL, the shaded
area in 2.4 indicates that it still cannot achieve 100% detection rate. In addition,
since patchwork algorithm is highly related to the positions of the patches, it is
vulnerable to de-synchronization attacks.
2.6.2 Histogram speciﬁcation based watermarking
methods
In 1999, Coltuc et al. proposed the idea of using histogram speciﬁcation for image
watermarking. In these methods, the watermark is embedded by modifying the
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Figure 2.4: Un-watermarked and watermarked distributions.
histogram of the host image into a desired shape. The modiﬁcation is executed by
rearranging the values of pixels in the host image and generating the histogram
which has the same shape as the watermark. At the detection stage, the histogram
of the received image is ﬁrstly constructed. Then the histogram of the received
image is compared with the watermark. If the histogram matches the watermark,
the received image is marked as watermarked. Otherwise, the received image is
detected as not watermarked.
In [48], Xiang et al. proposed a mean related histogram based watermarking
method [48]-[50]. To implement this algorithm, the host image is ﬁrst ﬁltered by a
Gaussian kernel low-pass ﬁlter to extract the robust features against common sig-
nal processing operations [57]. Then the mean value of the ﬁltered low-frequency
components is calculated as ζL. The gray level range used for watermark embed-
ding [(1−λH)ζL, (1+λH)ζL] is determined based on ζL, where λH is an empirically
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 31
chosen parameter. Within [(1−λH)ζL, (1+λH)ζL], take every neighboringM gray
levels as a bin, and denote every two neighboring bins as a group. In one group,
assume Bin 1 and Bin 2 are the ﬁrst and second bin, which contain lL1 and l
L
2
numbers of pixels respectively, the embedding rule is formulated as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
lL1
lL2
≥ TL, if wL = 1
lL2
lL1
≥ TL, if wL = 0
(2.33)
where TL is a pre-deﬁned threshold comprising between robustness and perceptual
quality. Therefore, by shifting pixels between Bin 1 and Bin 2, the watermark bit
can be embedded.
At the detection side the received image will ﬁrst go through a standard deviation
based search and a mean value based search. Then based on the selected mean
value ζ ′L after searching, the gray level range is determined and the bins and
groups are constructed. In one group, compare the populations l′L1 and l
′L
2 in both
bins and extract one watermark bit according to
w′L =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1, if
l′L1
l′L2
≥ 1
0, otherwise.
(2.34)
It has been shown in the mean related histogram based watermarking methods
that the histogram shape of an image is invariant to pixel position shifting and
insensitive to cropping, thus having potential to be exploited to tackle cropping
attacks and RBAs. However, these methods do not explicitly employ the histogram
shape of the image. Instead, they use the mean of the histogram to select gray
levels in a certain range and use the pixels corresponding to these gray levels
to form pixel groups for watermark embedding. A common drawback of these
methods is that many potential pixel groups which could contain more pixels
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are not formed and utilized for watermark embedding, which compromises their
robustness. Moreover, signal processing attacks and interpolation errors caused by
geometric attacks can also aﬀect the performance of histogram based methods. A
low-pass pre-ﬁltering step is applied in [48] to tackle this problem but the negative
impact on watermark decoding caused by pre-ﬁltering is not eﬀectively handled.
As a result, this method cannot guarantee 100% detection rate even when attacks
are absent.
Note that histogram has also been used in reversible watermarking [51]-[54]. How-
ever, attacks are usually not considered in reversible watermarking hence is not
robust against attacks.
2.7 Other Image Watermarking Methods
2.7.1 Invariant domain based watermarking methods
In order to tackle geometric attacks, various techniques have been utilized in image
watermarking. One approach is to embed watermarks in transform domains [94]-
[99]. In [94], the watermark is embedded in the Fourier-Mellin transform domain.
Consider a point from the host image I(uL, vL) and deﬁne the discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) as
FL(kL1 , k
L
2 ) =
NL1 −1∑
nL1=0
NL2 −1∑
nL2=0
I(uL, vL)e
−j2πuLkL1 /NL1 −j2πvLkL2 /NL2 (2.35)
where 0 ≤ uL < NL1 , 0 ≤ uL < NL2 . Assume
uL = e
ωL cos θL, vL = e
ωL sin θL (2.36)
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where ωL is a real number and 0 ≤ θL < 2π. Then the Fourier-Mellin transform
can be computed as
FLM(k
L
1 , k
L
2 ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2π
0
I(eωL cos θL, eωL sin θL)ei(k
L
1 ωL+k
L
2 θ
L)dωLdθ
L. (2.37)
By applying the hybrid operation of DFT and Fourier-Mellin transform, the RST
invariant domain can be obtained. However, the method [94] suﬀers from the
severe distortion in perceptual quality and the Fourier-Mellin domain is inherently
vulnerable to cropping. The DWT domain is used for image watermarking in [96].
Whilst the method in [96] is robust to aﬃne attacks, it is vulnerable to RBAs.
Kang et al. develop a watermarking method to resist geometric attacks by using
uniform log-polar mapping in [98], but it cannot tackle RBAs either. In [99], the
DCT and singular value decomposition are combined to deal with cropping attack.
However, this method does not perform well against signal processing attacks and
some geometric attacks such as scaling and rotation.
2.7.2 Template based watermarking methods
To handle geometric transforms, some watermarking methods use template [100]-
[107] to re-synchronize the received image with the watermarked host image by
removing or inverting the geometric distortion before watermark detection. The
templates can be categorized into two groups. The ﬁrst one is to be embedded with
the informative watermark as additional information [100]-[102]. At the decoding
end, the template can provide information about the geometric attacks which the
watermarked image has undergone. The method proposed by Pereira et al. embeds
a 25 points template in the DFT domain by using log-polar-map and log-log-map
to resist rotation and scaling [100]. Unfortunately this method is vulnerable to
the combination of rotation and scaling. To resist general aﬃne transformations,
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a line structure is applied to the template in [101]. In [102], the Chirp-Z transform
is employed for more accurate and faster template matching. The main drawback
of this type of template based methods is that the template can be estimated by
attackers and then removed. Besides, it is also diﬃcult for this type of template
based schemes to estimate the parameters used in RBAs [108], which would lead
to a severe degradation in robustness [103].
The second kind of templates is to be embedded as part of the informative wa-
termark [104]-[107]. In [104]-[106], the self-reference principle is utilized by using
auto-correlation function or the Fourier magnitude spectrum of a periodical wa-
termark. However, as mentioned in [108] and [109], they are also vulnerable to
template removal attack. Dugelay et al. proposed a template based watermarking
method in [107] using optical ﬂow to resist local geometric distortions including
RBAs, but this scheme is vulnerable to global geometric transforms such as aﬃne
transforms.
2.7.3 Spatial feature region based watermarking methods
The spatial feature region based watermarking methods are deﬁned as the second
generation watermarking methods in [110], which involve the notion of perceptually
signiﬁcant features in the host image. The spatial features can be edges, corners,
textured areas, etc. which have meaningful characteristics of the host image. The
spatial feature regions are illustrated in Fig. 2.5. Many image watermarking
methods based on spatial feature region have been reported in the literature [111]-
[119]. In the general process of these methods, the spatial feature points are ﬁrstly
extracted by feature points detectors, such as the Achard-Rouquet detector [120],
the SUSAN detector [121], the Harris detector [122] and the scale-invariant feature
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transform [123]. The feature points are then transformed into spatial regions with
known shape, size and orientation for watermark embedding. The watermark
embedding can take place in both spatial domain or transform domain. Normally
the same watermark is added to all spatial feature regions to resist cropping attack
and other de-synchronization attacks. At the detection stage, similar algorithm is
applied to extract the spatial feature regions thus the watermark information can
be detected in those regions. In [124], an optimal algorithm is proposed for feature
regions selection.
Figure 2.5: Illustration of spatial feature regions.
In spatial feature region based image watermarking methods, to correctly extract
the watermark information, the detection side usually requests strict synchroniza-
tion for the locations of the feature regions. However, the synchronization can be
interrupt by many factors, such as geometric attacks, image compression and even
the watermark embedding process itself.
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2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we investigated the performance of the existing image watermark-
ing methods. First, we considered the importance of copyright protection and
its applications. Some popular categories of image watermarking methods were
reviewed and their limitations were discussed. In the rest of the thesis we will de-
velop novel rank based, moment based, histogram based algorithms and a HFCM
post-processing step to improve the performance of the existing methods.
Chapter 3
Robust Rank Based High
Capacity Method
Among the image watermarking methods introduced in the previous chapter, SS
based and quantization based methods generally can achieve higher embedding
capacity under a given imperceptibility. However, for most of the SS based image
watermarking methods and quantization based image watermarking methods, as
the increase of the embedding capacity, they have to either decrease the host
sample space for each watermark bit or stack more watermark information on
one host sample, which will lead to the degradation in the detection performance.
Therefore, although these methods already have many problems to tackle with, the
situation will only become worse when the embedding capacity is high. To propose
an image watermarking method which is eﬀective at high embedding capacity
while HSI free and robust to common attacks such as noise addition, amplitude
scaling attack, constant luminance change and image compression, in this chapter
the host image is divided into blocks, followed by applying the 2-D DCT and
37
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zigzag scanning to these blocks. For each block, we randomly select the DCT
coeﬃcients to form the coeﬃcient sets by using a secret key, where each coeﬃcient
set will be used to carry one watermark bit. The watermark bits are embedded
by multiplying the selected coeﬃcients with an embedding matrix. A buﬀer is
also introduced at the embedding stage to enhance the robustness against various
attacks. At the decoding end, we construct the detection matrices from the selected
DCT coeﬃcients using the same secret key as embedding step in each block. By
checking the ranks of the detection matrices, we can extract the watermark bits.
Since only two coeﬃcients are used to embed one watermark bit, high embedding
capacity can be achieved. In addition, in the proposed method the embedding and
detection processes of diﬀerent watermark bits are completely independent. This
means that the detection performance of the proposed method will not be aﬀected
by the embedding capacity, which makes the proposed method very eﬀective at
high embedding rate. Besides, the proposed method is also robust to common
attacks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The proposed image water-
marking method is ﬁrstly introduced and the robustness of the proposed method
against diﬀerent attacks is then discussed in detail. After that, we theoretically
evaluate the perceptual quality and analyze the selection of parameters. Then the
experimental results are provided, which show the robustness of our method under
various conditions. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
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3.1 Proposed Method
The proposed image watermarking method is composed of two parts: watermark
embedding and watermark detection. Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show the watermark
embedding process and detection process, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram of watermark embedding process.
3.1.1 Watermark embedding
Consider a gray level host image I of size R × C. Without loss of generality, I
is partitioned into NR non-overlapping blocks I1, I2, . . . , INR , where the size of
each block is MR ×MR and MR is a positive integer power of 2. The 2-D DCT
is applied to each block to obtain the DCT counterparts FR {I1} , FR {I2} , . . . ,
FR {INR} of dimension MR ×MR. Since low-frequency components carry per-
ceptually important information and high-frequency components are vulnerable
to image compression attack, it is appropriate and common to use the DCT co-
eﬃcients corresponding to the middle-frequency range for watermark embedding
[125], [126]. In each block, we use a secret key to randomly select 2KR suitable
DCT coeﬃcients to form a DCT coeﬃcient set, where the purpose of using a secret
key is to introduce security. Denote the length-2KR coeﬃcient set in the nth block
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by
xRn = [x
R
n (1), x
R
n (2), . . . , x
R
n (2K
R)] (3.1)
where n = 1, 2, . . . , NR. From xRn , we can obtain K
R pairs of DCT coeﬃcients
xRn,1,x
R
n,2, . . . ,x
R
n,KR , where
xRn,k = [x
R
n (2k − 1), xRn (2k)]. (3.2)
Based on (3.1) and (3.2), it follows
xRn = [x
R
n,1,x
R
n,2, . . . ,x
R
n,KR ] (3.3)
where n = 1, 2, . . . , NR and k = 1, 2, . . . , KR. Each pair of DCT coeﬃcients will
be used to hide one watermark bit.
Let
wRn = [w
R
n (1), w
R
n (2), . . . , w
R
n (K
R)] (3.4)
be the sequence of KR watermark bits to be embedded into the nth image block,
where the watermark bit wRn (k) takes value from {0, 1}. Deﬁne the 2KR × 2KR
matrix
ARn
Δ
= {ARn (i, j)}1≤i,j≤2KR (3.5)
and let
ER0 =
⎡
⎣0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
⎤
⎦ and ER1 =
⎡
⎣1 0
0 1
⎤
⎦ . (3.6)
Based on the values of the watermark bits, we set the entry values ofARn as follows:⎡
⎣ARn (2k − 1, 2k − 1) ARn (2k − 1, 2k)
ARn (2k, 2k − 1) ARn (2k, 2k)
⎤
⎦
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ER0 , if w
R
n (k) = 0
ER1 , if w
R
n (k) = 1
(3.7)
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for k = 1, 2, . . . , KR.
Also, deﬁne the 1× 2KR vector
bRn
Δ
= {bRn (i)}1≤i≤2KR (3.8)
and initialize it as a zero vector. Let
TRn (k) = T
R − |xRn (2k − 1)− xRn (2k)| (3.9)
where TR is a threshold and |.| denotes the absolute function. For k = 1, 2, . . . , KR,
the element values of bRn are set as follows:
• If wRn (k) = 0 or TRn (k) ≤ 0, then
[bRn (2k − 1), bRn (2k)] = [0, 0]. (3.10)
• If wRn (k) = 1 and TRn (k) > 0, then
[bRn (2k − 1), bRn (2k)]
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[αRTRn (k), −βRTRn (k)], if xRn (2k − 1) ≥ xRn (2k)
[−αRTRn (k), βRTRn (k)], if xRn (2k − 1) < xRn (2k)
(3.11)
where αR and βR are weighting parameters satisfying αR ≥ 0, βR ≥ 0 and
αR + βR = 1.
Let
xRWn = [x
RW
n (1), x
RW
n (2), . . . , x
RW
n (2K
R)] (3.12)
be the watermarked counterpart of xRn . Given A
R
n and b
R
n , the sequence of water-
mark bits wRn are embedded into x
R
n using the following embedding rule:
xRWn = x
R
nA
R
n + b
R
n (3.13)
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where n = 1, 2, . . . , NR. Here, bRn acts as an error buﬀer in the embedding of wa-
termark bits. By replacing xRn in F
R {In} with xRWn , one can get the watermarked
counterpart of FR {In}, denoted as FR
{
IWn
}
. After that, we apply the 2-D inverse
discrete cosine transform (IDCT) to FR
{
IWn
}
to obtain the watermarked image
block IWn . Finally, the watermarked image I
W can be construct by combining all
of the watermarked image blocks together.
Remark 1: The proposed watermark embedding scheme uses only two DCT coef-
ﬁcients to hide one watermark bit. As a result, high embedding capacity can be
achieved. In contrast, those image watermarking methods reported in the litera-
ture like [18], [36] and [38] require more coeﬃcients to embed one watermark bit;
Otherwise, poor watermark detection performance is expected.
3.1.2 Watermark detection
Denote the received image as I′. Similar to the embedding process, I′ is divided
into NR non-overlapping blocks I′1, I
′
2, . . . , I
′
NR of dimension M
R ×MR. Applying
2-D DCT to the received image blocks yields the corresponding DCT compo-
nents FR {I′1} , FR {I′2} , . . . , FR
{
I′NR
}
of dimension MR×MR. In the nth block
FR {I′n}, the secret key can be used to ﬁnd the length-2KR DCT coeﬃcient set
x′Rn containing K
R watermark bits. Denoting
x′Rn = [x
′R
n (1), x
′R
n (2), . . . , x
′R
n (2K
R)] (3.14)
one can sequentially compute
x¯′Rn (k) = |x′Rn (2k − 1)− x′Rn (2k)| (3.15)
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and
T ′Rn (k) = max
{
x¯′Rn (k), T
R/2
}
. (3.16)
Based on T ′Rn (k), we construct the following detection matrix for the extraction of
the kth watermark bit in the nth block:
XRn,k =
⎡
⎣ TR/2 T ′Rn (k)
T ′Rn (k) T
R/2
⎤
⎦ (3.17)
where k = 1, 2, . . . , KR and n = 1, 2, . . . , NR.
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Figure 3.2: Block diagram of watermark detection.
In order to use XRn,k to extract the kth watermark bit in the nth block, let us
analyze the property of XRn,k in the absence of attacks. Since attacks are absent,
it is obvious that I′ = IW , which results in x′Rn = x
RW
n or x
′R
n (k) = x
RW
n (k) with
k = 1, 2, . . . , KR and n = 1, 2, . . . , NR. The analysis is conducted under two
scenarios: the watermark bit is “0” and the watermark bit is “1”.
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The case of wRn (k) = 0
If wRn (k) = 0, it follows from (3.6), (3.7), (3.10) and (3.13) that
[xRWn (2k − 1), xRWn (2k)]
= [xRn (2k − 1), xRn (2k)] · ER0 + [bRn (2k − 1), bRn (2k)]
=
[
xRn (2k − 1) + xRn (2k)
2
,
xRn (2k − 1) + xRn (2k)
2
]
(3.18)
which means
∣∣xRWn (2k − 1)− xRWn (2k)∣∣ = 0. (3.19)
Since x′Rn (k) = x
RW
n (k), it yields from (3.15) and (3.19) that
x¯′Rn (k) = 0. (3.20)
Based on (3.16) and (3.20), it follows
T ′Rn (k) = max
{
0, TR/2
}
= TR/2. (3.21)
Substituting (3.21) into (3.17), we can see that the detection matrix XRn,k is rank
deﬁcient as its entries have the same value TR/2.
The case of wRn (k) = 1
Without loss of generality, we ﬁrst consider the situation of wRn (k) = 1, T
R
n (k) > 0
and xRn (2k − 1) ≥ xRn (2k). From (3.6), (3.7), (3.11) and (3.13), we have
[x′Rn (2k − 1), x′Rn (2k)]
= [xRWn (2k − 1), xRWn (2k)]
= [xRn (2k − 1), xRn (2k)] · ER1 + [αRTRn (k), −βRTRn (k)]
=
[
xRn (2k − 1) + αRTRn (k), xRn (2k)− βRTRn (k)
]
. (3.22)
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Recall that αR + βR = 1. From (3.9), (3.15) and (3.22), it holds that
x¯′Rn (k) = |(xRn (2k − 1) + αRTRn (k))− (xRn (2k)− βRTRn (k))|
= |(xRn (2k − 1)− xRn (2k)) + (αRTRn (k) + βRTRn (k))|
= |TR − TRn (k) + TRn (k)|
= TR. (3.23)
Combing (3.16) and (3.23), we obtain
T ′Rn (k) = max
{
TR, TR/2
}
= TR. (3.24)
By substituting (3.24) into (3.17), one can see that the detection matrix XRn,k is of
full rank.
Also, it can be veriﬁed that XRn,k has full rank in the situation of w
R
n (k) = 1,
TRn (k) > 0 and x
R
n (2k − 1) < xRn (2k). Furthermore, it can be shown in a similar
way that XRn,k has full rank when w
R
n (k) = 1 and T
R
n (k) ≤ 0. In summary, the
detection matrix XRn,k is of full rank when w
R
n (k) = 1, regardless of the values of
TRn (k), x
R
n (2k − 1) and xRn (2k).
Based on the property of XRn,k, the kth watermark bit in the nth block can be
extracted using the following detection rule:
w′Rn (k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1, if XRn,k is of full rank
0, otherwise
(3.25)
where k = 1, 2, . . . , KR and n = 1, 2, . . . , NR. Finally, the extracted watermark
sequences w′R1 ,w
′R
2 , . . . ,w
′R
NR can be obtained by combining all of the detected
watermark bits.
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Remark 2: In the proposed watermarking method, watermark detection is imple-
mented by checking the ranks of the detection matrices, which makes our method
free of HSI. This feature is important for achieving high detection rate. Moreover,
the error buﬀer employed in the embedding process further enhances the detection
performance as it can, to a large extent, tolerate the errors imposed by attacks.
3.1.3 Selection of watermarking parameters
In the proposed watermarking method, αR, βR and TR are three important water-
marking parameters and their values need to be properly chosen. The parameter
TR is the threshold of the error buﬀer, which is primarily introduced to resist
Gaussian noise addition attack. The selection of TR will be discussed later in the
analysis of robustness against Gaussian noise addition. So, here we only discuss
how to select αR and βR.
The parameters αR and βR were introduced in (3.11) under the condition of
wRn (k) = 1 and T
R
n (k) > 0. We ﬁrst investigate the impact of α
R and βR on per-
ceptual quality. We assume, without loss of generality, that xRn (2k − 1) > xRn (2k).
According to (3.11) and (3.13), embedding a watermark bit into the kth pair of
DCT coeﬃcients in the nth block under the above condition results in
xRWn (2k − 1) = xRn (2k − 1) + αRTRn (k) (3.26)
and
xRWn (2k) = x
R
n (2k)− βRTRn (k). (3.27)
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Alternatively, (3.26) and (3.27) can be expressed as
FR
{
IWn
(
pRn (2k − 1), qRn (2k − 1)
)}
=FR
{
In
(
pRn (2k − 1), qRn (2k − 1)
)}
+ αRTRn (k) (3.28)
and
FR
{
IWn
(
pRn (2k), q
R
n (2k)
)}
=FR
{
In
(
pRn (2k), q
R
n (2k)
)}− βRTRn (k) (3.29)
where
(
pRn (2k − 1), qRn (2k − 1)
)
and
(
pRn (2k), q
R
n (2k)
)
are the indices of the DCT
coeﬃcients xRn (2k − 1) and xRn (2k), respectively, and
(
pRn (2k − 1), qRn (2k − 1)
) 	=(
pRn (2k), q
R
n (2k)
)
. Obviously, pRn (2k − 1), pRn (2k), qRn (2k − 1) and qRn (2k) are all
nonnegative integers.
Applying the 2-D IDCT to FR
{
IWn
}
, which represents the DCT coeﬃcients in the
nth block, the corresponding watermarked image block in the spatial domain can
be expressed as
IWn (i, j) =
MR−1∑
u=0
MR−1∑
v=0
ϑRuϑ
R
v F
R
{
IWn (u, v)
}
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
cos
(2j + 1)vπ
2MR
(3.30)
where 0 ≤ i ≤MR − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤MR − 1 and
ϑRu =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
√
1/MR, u = 0√
2/MR, u 	= 0
, ϑRv =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
√
1/MR, v = 0√
2/MR, v 	= 0
. (3.31)
From (3.28)-(3.30), it follows:
IWn (i, j) = In(i, j) + α
RTRn (k)ϑ
R
pRn (2k−1)ϑ
R
qRn (2k−1) cos
(2i+ 1)pRn (2k − 1)π
2MR
·
cos
(2j + 1)qRn (2k − 1)π
2MR
− βRTRn (k)ϑRpRn (2k)ϑRqRn (2k) ·
cos
(2i+ 1)pRn (2k)π
2MR
cos
(2j + 1)qRn (2k)π
2MR
= In(i, j) + α
RTRn (k)S
R
n,i,j(2k − 1)− βRTRn (k)SRn,i,j(2k). (3.32)
CHAPTER 3. ROBUST RANK BASED HIGH CAPACITY METHOD 48
Here, the deﬁnitions of SRn,i,j(2k − 1) and SRn,i,j(2k) can be easily seen from the
second equation in (3.32).
Given the nth host image block In and its watermarked counterpart I
W
n , we deﬁne
the distortion caused by watermark embedding as
ΔRn =
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
[
IWn (i, j)− In(i, j)
]2
. (3.33)
By substituting (3.32) into (3.33), it yields
ΔRn =
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
[
αRTRn (k)S
R
n,i,j(2k − 1)− βRTRn (k)SRn,i,j(2k)
]2
=
(
αR
)2 (
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1)−
2αRβR
(
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
SRn,i,j(2k − 1)SRn,i,j(2k) +
(
βR
)2 (
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k). (3.34)
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From the deﬁnition of SRn,i,j(2k − 1), we have
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1)
=
(
ϑRpRn (2k−1)
)2 (
ϑRqRn (2k−1)
)2⎛⎝MR−1∑
i=0
cos2
(2i+ 1)pRn (2k − 1)π
2MR
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝MR−1∑
j=0
cos2
(2j + 1)qRn (2k − 1)π
2MR
⎞
⎠
=
(
ϑRpRn (2k−1)
)2 (
ϑRqRn (2k−1)
)2
4
·⎛
⎝MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)
(
pRn (2k − 1) + pRn (2k − 1)
)
π
2MR
+
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)
(
pRn (2k − 1)− pRn (2k − 1)
)
π
2MR
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝MR−1∑
j=0
cos
(2j + 1)
(
qRn (2k − 1) + qRn (2k − 1)
)
π
2MR
+
MR−1∑
j=0
cos
(2j + 1)
(
qRn (2k − 1)− qRn (2k − 1)
)
π
2MR
⎞
⎠
=
(
ϑRpRn (2k−1)
)2 (
ϑRqRn (2k−1)
)2
4
·⎛
⎝MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)(2pRn (2k − 1))π
2MR
+MR
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝MR−1∑
j=0
cos
(2j + 1)(2qRn (2k − 1))π
2MR
+MR
⎞
⎠ . (3.35)
As will be shown in (3.63) and (3.64),
∑MR−1
i=0 cos
(2i+1)uπ
2MR
= 0 when u 	= 0 and∑MR−1
j=0 cos
(2j+1)vπ
2MR
= 0 when v 	= 0. Based on (3.31), (3.35), (3.63) and (3.64),
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when
(
pRn (2k − 1), qRn (2k − 1)
) 	= (0, 0), one has
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1) = 1
(MR)2
· (0 +MR) · (0 +MR)
= 1. (3.36)
Similarly, when pRn (2k − 1) 	= qRn (2k − 1) = 0 or qRn (2k − 1) 	= pRn (2k − 1) = 0, we
obtain
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1) = 1
2 (MR)2
· (MR +MR) · (0 +MR)
= 1. (3.37)
And when pRn (2k − 1) = qRn (2k − 1) = 0, it results in
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1) = 1
4 (MR)2
· (2MR) · (2MR)
= 1. (3.38)
From (3.36)-(3.38), the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (3.34) can be written
as
(
αR
)2 (
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k − 1) = (αR)2 (TRn (k))2 . (3.39)
Following the same way, the second term and third term on the right hand side of
(3.34) can be respectively derived to be
2αRβR
(
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
SRn,i,j(2k − 1)SRn,i,j(2k) = 0 (3.40)
and
(
βR
)2 (
TRn (k)
)2 MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
(
SR
)2
n,i,j
(2k) =
(
βR
)2 (
TRn (k)
)2
. (3.41)
Substituting (3.39)-(3.41) into (3.34), it follows:
ΔRn =
(
TRn (k)
)2 ((
αR
)2
+
(
βR
)2)
. (3.42)
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In order to ensure that the perceptual quality degradation caused by αR and βR
is minimum, ΔRn should be minimized. Recalling that α
R ≥ 0, βR ≥ 0 and
αR + βR = 1, (3.42) can be expanded as
ΔRn =
(
TRn (k)
)2 · ((αR)2 + (1− αR)2)
=
(
TRn (k)
)2 · (2 (αR)2 − 2αR + 1) . (3.43)
Minimizing the above ΔRn yields α
R = 0.5, which leads to βR = 1 − αR = 0.5.
Therefore, the desired αR and βR values are αR = βR = 0.5 as they cause the
minimum perceptual quality degradation on the image.
3.2 Analysis of Robustness Against Attacks
The types of attacks considered in [36] include Gaussian noise addition, amplitude
scaling, constant luminance change and compression. In this section, we analyze
the robustness of the proposed method against these attacks.
3.2.1 Robustness against Gaussian noise addition
The robustness of the proposed method against Gaussian noise addition is facil-
itated by the error buﬀer term bRn in (3.13). This can be explained by showing
the relationship between the error probability caused by Gaussian noise addition
and the buﬀer threshold TR. We assume that in the DCT domain, the Gaussian
noise follows the normal distribution Norm(0, σ2) whose mean and variance are 0
and σ2, respectively. Under a Gaussian noise addition attack, the kth pair of DCT
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coeﬃcients in the nth block of the received image can be expressed as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x′Rn (2k − 1) = xRWn (2k − 1) + χRn (2k − 1)
x′Rn (2k) = x
RW
n (2k) + χ
R
n (2k)
(3.44)
where χRn (2k − 1) and χRn (2k) are the corresponding noise components.
Now, we inspect how noise aﬀects the watermark detection result. When wRn (k) =
0, one has from (3.15), (3.19) and (3.44) that
x¯′Rn (k) =
∣∣χRn (2k − 1)− χRn (2k)∣∣ . (3.45)
According to (3.16), the detection error will occur when
∣∣χRn (2k − 1)− χRn (2k)∣∣ >
TR/2, which means χRn (2k−1)−χRn (2k) > TR/2 or χRn (2k−1)−χRn (2k) < −TR/2.
Since χRn (2k − 1) ∼ Norm(0, σ2) and χRn (2k) ∼ Norm(0, σ2), then χRn (2k − 1) −
χRn (2k) ∼ Norm(0, 2σ2). Hence, when wRn (k) = 0, the detection error probability
can be calculated as
ΦR0 =
1√
2π
∫ − TR
2
√
2σ
−∞
e−t
2/2dt+
1√
2π
∫ ∞
TR
2
√
2σ
e−t
2/2dt
=
2√
2π
∫ − TR
2
√
2σ
−∞
e−t
2/2dt. (3.46)
In a similar manner, we can show that when wRn (k) = 1 and T
R
n (k) ≤ 0, the
detection error probability is
ΦR1 =
1√
2π
∫ −TR+2TRn (k)
2
√
2σ
−3TR+2TRn (k)
2
√
2σ
e−t
2/2dt. (3.47)
And when wRn (k) = 1 and T
R
n (k) > 0, the detection error probability is
ΦR2 =
1√
2π
∫ −TR
2
√
2σ
−3TR
2
√
2σ
e−t
2/2dt. (3.48)
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From (3.46)-(3.48), it is obvious that the buﬀer threshold TR has a big impact on
the detection error probability caused by Gaussian noise addition. In (3.46), the
larger TR is, the smaller ΦR0 is, which leads to higher robustness against Gaussian
noise addition attack. In (3.47) and (3.48), when TR is relatively small, ΦR1 and
ΦR2 will increase with the rise of T
R. However, after a certain TR value, ΦR1 and
ΦR2 will fall with the growth of T
R. For illustration purpose, Fig. 3.3 shows the
plots of ΦR0 , Φ
R
1 and Φ
R
2 versus T
R, where σ = 1 and TRn (k) = −0.5. It can be seen
that good resistance against Gaussian noise addition can be obtained by setting
TR to a value much greater than TR = 1.5. Therefore, by choosing a fairly large
TR value, the error buﬀer term bRn in (3.13) makes the proposed method robust
to Gaussian noise addition attack. On the other hand, it can be seen from (3.9),
(3.11) and (3.13) that increasing TR will lower perceptual quality. A suitable TR
value can be chosen experimentally.
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Figure 3.3: ΦR0 , Φ
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1 and Φ
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2 versus T
R, where σ = 1 and TRn (k) = −0.5.
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3.2.2 Robustness against amplitude scaling
Assume that the watermarked image block IWn is scaled by a scaling factor η
(η > 0). Under an amplitude scaling attack, one can express the kth pair of DCT
coeﬃcients in the nth block of the received image as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x′Rn (2k − 1) = η · xRWn (2k − 1)
x′Rn (2k) = η · xRWn (2k)
. (3.49)
From (3.15), it follows
x¯′Rn (k) = η ·
∣∣xRWn (2k − 1)− xRWn (2k)∣∣ . (3.50)
When the embedded watermark bit wRn (k) = 0, it holds from (3.19) and (3.50) that
x¯′Rn (k) = 0. Further, from (3.16) and (3.17), we obtain T
′R
n (k) = max
{
0, TR/2
}
=
TR/2 and XRn,k =
⎡
⎣TR/2 TR/2
TR/2 TR/2
⎤
⎦, respectively. Obviously, XRn,k is rank deﬁcient.
According to (3.25), the extracted watermark bit is “0”, which is the expected
result.
When the embedded watermark bit wRn (k) = 1, we can similarly show that
x¯′Rn (k) ≥ TR. If η > 0.5, then η · x¯′Rn (k) > TR/2. From (3.16) and (3.17), it gives
T ′Rn (k) = max
{
η · x¯′Rn (k), TR/2
}
= η · x¯′Rn (k) and XRn,k =
⎡
⎣ TR/2 η · x¯′Rn (k)
η · x¯′Rn (k) TR/2
⎤
⎦.
Since XRn,k is of full rank, the extracted watermark bit is “1”, which is the desired
result. On the other hand, if η ≤ 0.5, there is the possibility that η · x¯′Rn (k) ≤ T
R
2
.
Since T ′Rn (k) = T
R/2 in this case, XRn,k will be rank deﬁcient, which leads to incor-
rect watermark detection result. However, a scaling factor of 0.5 or even smaller
can degrade the perceptual quality of the watermarked image signiﬁcantly. Thus,
such level of severe amplitude scaling attack is not desirable for the attackers. Let
CHAPTER 3. ROBUST RANK BASED HIGH CAPACITY METHOD 55
us take the famous benchmark image Lena as an example. An amplitude scaling
attack with factor 0.5 on Lena will give a PSNR value of 24.07 dB, which means
the perceptual quality is too bad for most of the applications. Therefore, in gen-
eral, the proposed watermarking method has good resistance against amplitude
scaling attacks.
3.2.3 Robustness against constant luminance change
Given the nth host image block IWn of size M
R ×MR, the (u, v)th entry of the
corresponding DCT counterpart FR
{
IWn
}
can be computed by
FR
{
IWn (u, v)
}
=
MR−1∑
i=0
MR−1∑
j=0
ϑRuϑ
R
v I
W
n (i, j) cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
cos
(2j + 1)vπ
2MR
(3.51)
where i and j are the indices of pixels, u and v are the indices of the DCT coeﬃ-
cients, 0 ≤ u ≤ MR − 1, 0 ≤ v ≤ MR − 1, and ϑRu and ϑRv are deﬁned in (3.31).
Assume that IWn has undergone a constant luminance change of +δ
R. Then, the
(u, v)th pixel of the nth received image block I′n can be expressed as
I′n(u, v) = I
W
n (u, v) + δ
R. (3.52)
Applying 2-D DCT to the two sides of (3.52), one has
FR {I′n(u, v)} = FR
{
IWn (u, v)
}
+ ϑRuϑ
R
v δ
R ·
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
MR−1∑
j=0
cos
(2j + 1)vπ
2MR
. (3.53)
Now, let us have a closer look at the ﬁrst cosine term in (3.53). Since MR is a
positive integer power of 2, MR/2 is a positive integer. If u is a nonzero positive
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odd integer (i.e., u = 1, 3, 5, . . .), it can be veriﬁed that
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=0,1,...,MR/2−1
= − cos (2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=MR−1,MR−2,...,MR/2
. (3.54)
The veriﬁcation of the equations in (3.54) is straightforward, as shown in the
following two examples:
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=0
= cos
uπ
2MR
= − cos
(
uπ − uπ
2MR
)
= − cos (2 · (M
R − 1) + 1)uπ
2MR
= − cos (2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=MR−1
and
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=MR/2−1
= cos
(MR − 1)uπ
2MR
= − cos
(
uπ − (M
R − 1)uπ
2MR
)
= − cos (M
R + 1)uπ
2MR
= − cos (2 ·M
R/2 + 1)uπ
2MR
= − cos (2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=MR/2
.
From (3.54), it follows
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
= 0, u = 1, 3, 5, . . . . (3.55)
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On the other hand, if u is a nonzero positive even integer (i.e., u = 2, 4, 6, . . .),
similar to (3.54), it can be shown that
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=0,1,...,MR/2−1
= cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
∣∣∣∣
i=MR−1,MR−2,...,MR/2
(3.56)
which leads to
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
= 2 ·
⎛
⎝MR/2−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
⎞
⎠ . (3.57)
Since u is a nonzero positive even integer, we can decompose it as u = 2 · (u/2).
If u/2 is also an even integer, we can further decompose u as u = 22 · (u/22). In
this way, we can eventually obtain
u = 2mR · u′ (3.58)
where mR is a nonzero positive integer and
u′ = u/2mR (3.59)
is a nonzero positive odd integer. For example, if u = 56, then the corresponding
mR and u
′ are 3 and 7, respectively. Now, we consider the decomposition of
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∑MR−1
i=0 cos
(2i+1)uπ
2MR
. By repeatedly using (3.57), it results in
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
= 2 ·
⎛
⎝2 ·
⎛
⎝(MR/2)/2−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
= 22 ·
⎛
⎝MR/22−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
⎞
⎠
...
...
...
= 2mR ·
⎛
⎝MR/2mR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
⎞
⎠
= 2mR ·
⎛
⎝MR/2mR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1) (u/2mR) π
2 · (MR/2mR)
⎞
⎠
= 2mR ·
⎛
⎝M ′R−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)u′π
2M ′R
⎞
⎠ (3.60)
where
M ′R = MR/2mR . (3.61)
Recall that MR is a positive integer power of 2 and 0 ≤ u ≤ MR − 1. Since
u = 2mR · u′ and u′ is a nonzero positive odd integer, it is clear that u ≥ 2mR ,
which leads to 2mR ≤ u ≤ MR − 1 or 2mR ≤ u < MR. Based on the properties
of MR and u, it is easy to verify that M ′R is also a positive power of 2 and
0 ≤ u′ ≤ M ′R − 1. Moreover, since u′ is a nonzero positive odd integer, from
(3.55), it holds that
∑M ′R−1
i=0 cos
(2i+1)u′π
2M ′R = 0. In combination with (3.60), we
obtain
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
= 0, u = 2, 4, 6, . . . . (3.62)
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Based on (3.55) and (3.62), we can conclude that
MR−1∑
i=0
cos
(2i+ 1)uπ
2MR
= 0 if u 	= 0. (3.63)
Similarly, it can be shown that
MR−1∑
j=0
cos
(2j + 1)vπ
2MR
= 0 if v 	= 0. (3.64)
Based on (3.53), (3.63) and (3.64), when (u, v) 	= (0, 0),
FR {I′n(u, v)} = FR
{
IWn (u, v)
}
. (3.65)
This means that constant luminance change does not alter the DCT coeﬃcients of
the watermarked image block, except for the DCT coeﬃcient at (u, v) = (0, 0). As
mentioned before, only the DCT coeﬃcients corresponding to the middle-frequency
range will be used to embed watermark bits, i.e., the DCT coeﬃcient at (u, v) =
(0, 0) will not be utilized for watermark embedding. Therefore, the proposed
method is robust against constant luminance change attack.
3.2.4 Robustness against compression
It is shown in [125] that image compression attack has more impact on the DCT
coeﬃcients relating to the region of high-frequency. Moreover, the DCT coef-
ﬁcients associated with the middle-frequency range are considered to be more
robust against image compression attack [126]. In the proposed method, the resis-
tance towards image compression attack results from using the DCT coeﬃcients
corresponding to the middle-frequency region for watermark embedding. It is ex-
pected that increasing embedding rate will decrease the robustness to compression
attacks. The reason is that in this scenario, some DCT coeﬃcients outside the
middle-frequency region might have to be employed to embed watermarks.
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Figure 3.4: BER (under Gaussian noise addition attack) and PSNR of the proposed
method versus TR, where the embedding rate is 20480 watermark bits per image.
3.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed image watermarking
method by simulations, in comparison with the methods in [18], [36] and [38]. [18]
is an SS based method with a new watermark detector which exploits the multi-
carrier concept to tackle HSI. [36] and [38] are quantization based methods which
focus on combating amplitude scaling attack. The modiﬁed Watson’s perceptual
model, which scales linearly with the amplitude scaling attack, is utilized in [36]
to adaptively select the quantization amount. In [38], the host signal is divided
into two parts and quantization is implemented in both parts, respectively. Eight
standard 512 × 512 8-bit gray scale images Bee, Elaine, Goldhill, Hill, Lena, Light-
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house, Truck, and Zelda are used as host images, which are shown in the top two
rows of Fig. 3.5. The PSNR index and the BER index are used to measure percep-
tual quality and robustness, respectively. The performance indices PSNR and BER
are calculated by averaging the results obtained from the eight images. Regarding
imperceptibility, the larger PSNR value, the better perceptual quality. It is men-
tioned in [41] that the PSNR value of 40 dB indicates good perceptual quality. For
example, the bottom two rows of Fig. 3.5 show the watermarked counterparts of
the afore-mentioned eight images by our method, where PSNR=40.32 dB. Clearly,
there is no visual diﬀerence between the original images and their watermarked
versions. For the illustration purpose, in Fig. 3.6 we enlarge the original image
Lena and its watermarked counterpart from Fig. 3.5 to demonstrate the good
perceptual quality of our proposed method. With regard to robustness, a smaller
BER value indicates better robustness, and vice versa.
In the simulations, we choose NR = 4096 for all images. Two embedding rates:
12288 and 20480 watermark bits per image are considered, which correspond to
KR = 3 and 5, respectively. As for TR, in order to experimentally choose a
suitable value, we embed 20480 watermark bits into each host image and then apply
Gaussian noise addition to the watermarked images. Four diﬀerent noise variances
are considered, which are σ2 = 1, 4, 7 and 10, respectively. The simulation results
about robustness and perceptual quality are shown in Fig. 3.4. As expected,
as TR rises, BER decreases (or the resistance against Gaussian noise addition
increases). Meanwhile, the perceptual quality, measured by PSNR, degrades with
the escalation of TR. To achieve satisfactory robustness while maintaining good
perceptual quality, we choose TR = 15 for our method.
The robustness of our method and those in [18], [36] and [38] is compared under
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Table 3.1: PSNRs under diﬀerent embedding rates
Watermarking method
PSNR (dB)
12288 bits 20480 bits
Proposed method 42.51 40.32
Method in [18] 41.76 39.57
Method in [36] 39.93 39.80
Method in [38] 41.73 39.53
diﬀerent embedding rates. The comparison is conducted both in the absence and
in the presence of attacks. Same as [36], the Gaussian noise addition, amplitude
scaling, constant luminance change, and JPEG compression attacks are considered
in the simulations. In order to have a fair comparison of robustness, we set the
corresponding amplitudes as 6 in [18] and the global constant for the modiﬁed
Watson algorithm as 0.17 in [36]. In [38], we used a one-level wavelet transform
with HAAR ﬁlter and set the norm order to 1.918 and the quantization step as
0.104. As a result, it has been ensured that the watermarked images produced by
our method have higher perceptual quality than those produced by the methods in
[18], [36] and [38]. The PSNRs of the four watermarking methods under diﬀerent
embedding rates are shown in Table 3.1.
Tables 3.2-3.6 show the BERs of the concerned watermarking methods. Specif-
ically, Table 3.2 shows the results when attack is absent. For a watermarking
method, its BER value obtained in the absence of attacks indicates the impact of
HSI. Since HSI does not exist in the proposed method, perfect watermark detec-
tion can be achieved, regardless of the embedding rates. The quantization based
methods [36] and [38] also show nearly perfect and perfect detection results, re-
spectively. In contrast, the SS base method [18] cannot reach zero BER due to the
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impact of HSI. Besides, its BER increases with the rise of the embedding rates.
Table 3.2: BERs under diﬀerent embedding rates, in the absence of attack
Embedding Rate
Proposed Method Method Method
method in [18] in [36] in [38]
12288 bits 0 0.0746 0.0001 0
20480 bits 0 0.2435 0.0001 0
Table 3.3 shows the results when Gaussian noise addition attack is present. We
can see that the proposed method performs much better than the methods in [18],
[36] and [38] in all situations. Moreover, as the embedding rate increases, the
performance gap between our method and the other methods widens. The reason
is that in the presence of Gaussian noise addition attack, the detection performance
of the proposed method is determined by the threshold TR used in the error buﬀer,
which is irrelevant to embedding rates. On the contrary, the detection performance
of the methods in [18], [36] and [38] degrades with the increase of embedding rates.
The BERs of the four methods against amplitude scaling attack and constant lu-
minance change attack are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. It can be
seen that the proposed method achieves zero BER under both attacks. This result
is not surprising. As we have theoretically analyzed, our method can correctly ex-
tract watermarks in the presence of amplitude scaling attack so long as the scaling
factor is greater than 0.5 and in the presence of constant luminance change attack
if the DCT coeﬃcient at (u, v) = (0, 0) is not used for watermark embedding. The
methods in [36] and [38], which are speciﬁcally designed to tackle amplitude scal-
ing attack, also achieve perfect and almost perfect detection results, respectively,
in the presence of amplitude scaling attack. However, they are not robust against
constant luminance change attack. Regarding the method in [18], it is not robust
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Table 3.3: BERs under diﬀerent embedding rates, in the presence of Gaussian
noise addition attack
Embedding Rate
Noise variance Proposed Method Method Method
σ2 method in [18] in [36] in [38]
12288 bits
1 0.0001 0.0995 0.0306 0.0097
4 0.0061 0.1438 0.1484 0.0495
7 0.0329 0.1953 0.2119 0.0887
10 0.0676 0.2348 0.2508 0.1250
20480 bits
1 0.0001 0.2609 0.0607 0.0547
4 0.0062 0.2798 0.2075 0.1412
7 0.0329 0.3138 0.2737 0.1989
10 0.0676 0.3388 0.3124 0.2425
against either of the two attacks.
The impact of JPEG compression attack on the proposed method and the methods
in [18], [36] and [38] is shown in Table 3.6. One can see that the proposed method
and the method in [38] performs much better than the other two methods. Between
the proposed method and the method in [38] themselves, they have comparable
BERs when the embedding rate is 12288 bits. However, in the case of embedding
20480 bits, our method outperforms the latter by large margins.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we propose a novel image watermarking method with high em-
bedding capacity and robust to common attacks. In our method, the 2-D DCT
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Table 3.4: BERs under diﬀerent embedding rates, in the presence of amplitude
scaling attack
Embedding Rate Scaling factor
Proposed Method Method Method
method in [18] in [36] in [38]
12288 bits
60% 0 0.0924 0.0001 0
80% 0 0.0822 0.0001 0
120% 0 0.0851 0.0001 0
140% 0 0.0891 0.0001 0
20480 bits
60% 0 0.2542 0.0001 0
80% 0 0.2525 0.0001 0
120% 0 0.2443 0.0001 0
140% 0 0.2487 0.0001 0
Table 3.5: BERs under diﬀerent embedding rates, in the presence of constant
luminance change attack
Embedding Rate Luminance change
Proposed Method Method Method
method in [18] in [36] in [38]
12288 bits
+10 0 0.0746 0.0024 0.2878
-10 0 0.0770 0.0057 0.3329
+30 0 0.0770 0.0213 0.4790
-30 0 0.0910 0.1077 0.4989
20480 bits
+10 0 0.2446 0.0051 0.3971
-10 0 0.2494 0.0096 0.4398
+30 0 0.2470 0.0395 0.4791
-30 0 0.2529 0.1343 0.5000
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Table 3.6: BERs under diﬀerent embedding rates, in the presence of JPEG com-
pression attack
Embedding Rate Quality factor
Proposed Method Method Method
method in [18] in [36] in [38]
12288 bits
50 0.2644 0.4789 0.4553 0.2593
70 0.1120 0.4738 0.4070 0.1513
90 0.0007 0.3157 0.1946 0.0345
20480 bits
50 0.2698 0.4829 0.4730 0.3577
70 0.1191 0.4799 0.4380 0.2655
90 0.0018 0.3785 0.2585 0.1138
domain is employed for watermark embedding. Coeﬃcients are selected by a se-
cret key to form the coeﬃcient sets, which will be further used to carry watermark
bits. A buﬀer is introduced during the embedding step to enhance the robust-
ness against various attacks. The watermark detection is based on checking the
ranks of the detection matrices hence HSI free. The embedding and detection al-
gorithm guarantee that the detection performance will not degrade as the increase
of the embedding capacity, which makes the proposed method eﬀective at high
embedding capacity. The performance of the proposed method is demonstrated
by theoretical analysis and simulation results. This method is suitable for appli-
cations which need high embedding capacity and consider only signal processing
attacks, like broadcasting.
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(a) Original Bee (b) Original Elaine (c) Original Goldhill (d) Original Hill
(e) Original Lena (f) Original Lighthouse (g) Original Truck (h) Original Zelda
(i) Watermarked Bee (j) Watermarked Elaine (k) Watermarked Goldhill (l) Watermarked Hill
(m) Watermarked Lena (n) Watermarked Lighthouse (o) Watermarked Truck (p) Watermarked Zelda
Figure 3.5: Upper two rows: original images Bee, Elaine, Goldhill, Hill, Lena,
Lighthouse, Truck, and Zelda. Lower two rows: watermarked counterparts of these
images, where PSNR=40.32 dB.
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Figure 3.6: Enlarged original image Lena and its watermarked counterpart.
Chapter 4
Moment Based Method Robust
to Cropping
In Chapter 3, we proposed a rank based image watermarking method, which is
robust to signal processing operations. In this chapter, we develop an image water-
marking method robust to not only signal processing but also geometric attacks.
The traditional moment-based watermarking schemes show good robustness to
common signal processing attacks and some geometric attacks but are sensitive to
cropping attack. In image watermarking, cropping is a common geometric attack.
By cutting some part of the image, the synchronization between the transmitter
and the receiver can be destroyed without degrading the perceptual quality sig-
niﬁcantly. Moreover, with some image processing tools, cropping can be easily
operated nowadays even by a person who does not have much knowledge about
image watermarking. In this chapter we propose a moment base image watermark-
ing method to tackle cropping attack. In the proposed method, we ﬁrst obtain the
PPVD of an image. Then, we reshape and normalize the PPVD to construct a two
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dimensional image. Finally, the moment invariants are calculated from the PPVD
image for watermark embedding. The proposed method is robust to cropping at-
tack because PPVD is insensitive to cropping (the insensitivity is approximate as
stated before). It is also robust to other geometric attacks and signal processing
attacks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First the geometrical moment
invariants are reviewed. Then the new image watermarking method is presented.
After that, the performance of the proposed method is analyzed. Followed by the
experimental results which show the robustness of the our method against various
attacks. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
4.1 Moment Invariants
The (p+ q)th order geometric moments mMpq of a gray scale image I are deﬁned as
mMpq =
∫ R
1
∫ C
1
(
xM
)p (
yM
)q
I(xM , yM)dxMdyM (4.1)
where xM and yM are the indices of pixels, R and C are the number of rows and
columns of the image I, respectively. The central moments μMpq can be described
as
μMpq =
∫ R
1
∫ C
1
(xM − x¯M)p(yM − y¯M)qI(xM , yM)d(xM − x¯M)d(yM − y¯M) (4.2)
where
x¯M = mM10/m
M
00 and y¯
M = mM01/m
M
00 . (4.3)
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In [93], Hu proposed seven functions invariant to orthogonal transformations,
which are
ψM1 = μ
M
20 + μ
M
02
ψM2 = (μ
M
20 − μM02)2 + 4
(
μM11
)2
ψM3 = (μ
M
30 − 3μM12)2 + (3μM21 − μM03)2
ψM4 = (μ
M
30 + μ
M
12)
2 + (μM21 + μ
M
03)
2
ψM5 = (μ
M
30 − 3μM12)(μM30 + μM12)[(μM30 + μM12)2 − 3(μM21 + μM03)2]
+ (3μM21 − μM03)(μM21 + μM03)[3(μM30 + μM12)2 − (μM21 + μM03)2]
ψM6 = (μ
M
20 − μM02)[(μM30 + μM12)2 − (μM21 + μM03)2] + 4μM11(μM30 + μM12)(μM21 + μM03)
ψM7 = (3μ
M
21 − μM03)(μM30 + μM12)[(μM30 + μM12)2 − 3(μM21 + μM03)2]
− (μM30 − 3μM12)(μM21 + μM03)[3(μM30 + μM12)2 − (μM21 + μM03)2].
(4.4)
Table 4.1 shows the value of
ψM∗i = |log10ψMi |, i = 1, 2, . . . , 7 (4.5)
for the widely used image Lena, which is shown in Fig. 4.6(a), after common
signal processing and geometric attacks. It can be seen from Table 4.1 that
ψM∗1 , ψ
M∗
2 , . . . , ψ
M∗
7 are robust against many signal processing and geometric at-
tacks but not robust against cropping attack.
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Table 4.1: Moment invariants ψM∗ for image Lena
Attack ψM∗1 ψ
M∗
2 ψ
M∗
3 ψ
M∗
4 ψ
M∗
5 ψ
M∗
6 ψ
M∗
7
Original Image 6.6219 18.8256 27.4747 25.2049 54.6461 34.8360 51.6415
Median Filtering 6.6209 18.8004 27.4167 25.1842 54.3421 34.8023 51.5823
Gaussian Noise 6.6219 18.8279 27.4812 25.2044 54.6279 34.8373 51.6441
Salt & Pepper Noise 6.6218 18.8376 27.4864 25.2189 54.7230 34.8556 51.6682
JPEG 20% 6.6218 18.8269 27.4779 25.2050 54.6851 34.8367 51.6432
Rotation 1◦ 6.6219 18.8260 27.4781 25.2053 54.6115 34.8365 51.6439
Scaling 50% 6.6219 18.8256 27.4745 25.2049 54.6501 34.8360 51.6415
Scaling 110% 6.6222 18.8349 27.5710 25.2024 54.5427 34.8420 51.6863
Cropping 10% 6.5835 16.9721 24.0447 25.0950 49.7906 33.9937 51.1459
4.2 Proposed Method
4.2.1 PPVD
For an 8-bit gray scale image I, it contains 256 gray levels. For any pixel, its value
will be within [0, 255]. The pixel value distribution hM can be deﬁned as
hM = {hM(i)|i = 0, 1, . . . , 255} (4.6)
where hM(i) is the number of pixels whose values are i. Then the PPVD of the
image I is described as
pM =
hM
RC
= {pM(i)|i = 0, 1, . . . , 255} (4.7)
where
pM(i) =
hM(i)
RC
. (4.8)
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This means that given the image I, the corresponding PPVD can be obtained
using (4.7) and (4.8). Next, some special feature of PPVD will be employed to
develop a new image watermarking method robust to cropping and other common
attacks.
۷ ܘெ
۷௣ಾ 
Figure 4.1: Process of watermark embedding.
4.2.2 Watermark embedding
The process of watermark embedding is shown in Fig. 4.1. In order to exploit
the invariant properties of PPVD, especially the cropping invariant property, the
moment invariants will be calculated from a PPVD image IpM instead of the orig-
inal image I. To construct IpM , ﬁrstly the 1 × 256 vector pM containing PPVD
information is extracted from I by using (4.7) and (4.8), followed by reshaping the
vector pM into a 16×16 matrix. Then, the elements of the matrix are further nor-
malized to [0, 255] to obtain IpM . After that, we calculate the moment invariants
ψM∗1 , ψ
M∗
2 , . . . , ψ
M∗
7 from the PPVD image IpM using (4.4) and (4.5) and construct
a function fM(ΨM∗) as follows [39]:
fM(ΨM∗) = αM1 ψ
M∗
1 + α
M
2 ψ
M∗
2 + · · ·+ αM7 ψM∗7 (4.9)
where αM1 , α
M
2 , · · · , αM7 are the weight factors determined by a secret key. It has
been shown in Table 4.1 that for each ψM∗i , the robustness to varies attacks is
CHAPTER 4. MOMENT BASED METHOD ROBUST TO CROPPING 74
diﬀerent. If there is certain information about the potential attacks, one can
adjust the values of αM1 , α
M
2 , · · · , αM7 to enhance the robustness against speciﬁc
attacks. Otherwise, we equally choose the αM values by αMi = {17 , i = 1, 2, . . . , 7},
which are used in this chapter.
In the embedding process, we will modify pM such that fM(ΨM∗) equals a prede-
ﬁned value M¯ . We start with taking neighboring SM pixel values as a bin to form
LM bins. The relationship between SM and LM can be shown as
LM =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
256
SM
, if Mod
(
256, SM
)
= 0
⌊
256
SM
⌋
+ 1, otherwise
(4.10)
where Mod(.) is the modulus function. In this chapter we set SM as a power of 2
thus the number of gray values in each bin will be the same. Without changing
the total probability in one bin, we equalize the probabilities of all pixel values in
this bin. Since SM is the power of 2, we can divide the SM gray values into two
parts with S
M
2
gray values each. Denote the ﬁrst S
M
2
gray values as PV1 and the
rest as PV2. We assume the probabilities of a pixel takes value in PV1 and PV2
are aM and bM , respectively. If aM > bM , the probability of taking value PV1 is
reduced by
EMaM bM =
aM − bM
2
(4.11)
and the probability of taking value PV2 is increased by E
M
aM bM . This modiﬁcation
can be achieved by randomly selecting EMaM bMRC pixels whose value is PV1 and
add S
M
2
to their pixel values.
Denote the probabilities relating to PV1 and PV2 after the modiﬁcation by a
′M
and b′M , respectively. Clearly, a′M = aM−EMaM bM and b′M = bM+EMaM bM . Further,
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we have
a′M = aM − EMaM bM
=
aM + bM
2
= bM +
aM − bM
2
= bM + EMaM bM
= b′M . (4.12)
The equation a′M = b′M means that the number of pixels with value PV1 is now
the same as the number of pixels with value PV2. This completes the equalization
process. If aM < bM , we can equalize the corresponding probabilities in a similar
manner.
After the equalization process, we consider two neighboring bins as a group and
the group number GM is expressed as
GM =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
LM
2
, if Mod
(
LM , 2
)
= 0⌊
LM
2
⌋
, otherwise.
(4.13)
Denote the two bins in a group by Bin1 and Bin2, and assume that the pixel values
in Bin1 are smaller than those in Bin2. Let c
M and dM be the total probabilities
of Bin1 and Bin2, respectively. If c
M > dM , we randomly pick EMcMdMRC pixels for
each pixel value in Bin1, and add S
M to their pixel values to shift the probability
to that of Bin2, where E
M
cMdM = β
M ·
⌊
cM−dM
2SM
⌋
and βM ∈ [0, 1]. If cM < dM , the
process will be similar. After this ﬁnal modiﬁcation, fM(ΨM∗) will be adjusted to
M¯ . Note that when βM = 0.5, the last modiﬁcation is the same as the equalization.
The original image Lena, Barbara, Cameraman and Boat and their watermarked
versions are shown in Fig. 4.6. For the illustration purpose, in Fig. 4.7 we enlarge
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the original image Fig. Lena and its watermarked counterpart from Fig. 4.6 to
demonstrate the good perceptual quality of our proposed method.
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Figure 4.2: Process of watermark detection.
4.2.3 Watermark detection
Fig. 4.2 shows the process of watermark detection. Similar to the procedures in
watermark embedding, we ﬁrst extract the PPVD information p′M , whose size is
1× 256, from the received image I′. Then reshape p′M into a 16× 16 matrix and
normalized it to [0, 255] to generate the PPVD image I′pM from p
′M . After that,
we calculate the moment invariants f ′M(ΨM∗) from I′pM with the help of the secret
key and obtain the distance between f ′M(ΨM∗) and M¯ by
εM = |f ′M(ΨM∗)− M¯ |. (4.14)
If distance εM is smaller than a predeﬁned threshold TM , the watermark can be
claimed as detected. Same as other moment base image watermarking schemes,
the proposed watermarking method is a one-bit scheme. Since the original image
is not needed at the detection phase, the new watermarking method is blind. The
value of εM should be decided by the strength of the possible attacks. In this
chapter, εM = 0.2 is experimentally determined [39].
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4.3 Performance Analysis
In this section, we will investigate the the insensitivity of pM(i) to common geo-
metric attacks and evaluate the perceptual quality.
4.3.1 Insensitivity of pM(i) to common geometric attacks
Assume the size of the host image I is R×C, where R and C denote the number
of rows and columns of the image, respectively. Denote NM as the number of
pixels in I, then NM = RC. The parameters hM(i) and pM(i) related to the
host image I are deﬁned in (4.6) and (4.7), respectively. For the image undergone
geometric attacks, the corresponding symbols and parameters are I′, N ′M , R′,
C ′, h′M(i) and p′M(i), respectively. The geometric attacks generally introduce
an interpolation process for images, which will cause interpolation errors such as
aliasing, blocking and blurring [127]. However, the purpose of attacks is not to
change the content of the images completely, hence the perceptual quality of the
attacked image should be maintained to an acceptable level. As a result, the
errors introduced by interpolations are often small and thus will be ignored in the
following analysis.
We ﬁrst consider scaling attack with scaling factor nM1 and n
M
2 in vertical and
horizontal directions, respectively. After scaling, R′ = nM1 R and C
′ = nM2 C,
which lead to
N ′M = R′C ′
= nM1 n
M
2 N
M . (4.15)
From (4.15) we can see that after scaling the total number of pixels will increase
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by a factor nM1 n
M
2 . Assuming the number of pixels in each gray level will increase
correspondingly, according to (4.15), we can get
h′M(i) = nM1 n
M
2 h
M(i). (4.16)
Considering the deﬁnition of pM(i) together with (4.15) and (4.16), we have
p′M(i) =
h′M(i)
R′C ′
=
nM1 n
M
2 h
M(i)
nM1 n
M
2 RC
=
hM(i)
RC
= pM(i). (4.17)
This means that pM(i) is invariant to scaling attacks.
Then we consider rotation, translation, shearing and aﬃne attacks. In a rotation
attack, the orientation of the image will be changed by a certain angle. A trans-
lation attack will move every pixel in the image by the same amount in a given
direction. Under a shearing attack, the image will be stretched, which will only
shift the positions of the pixels. Therefore, it is obvious that rotation, transla-
tion and shearing attacks only make the pixels change their positions. Similarly,
since aﬃne transform can be considered as a combination of scaling, rotation,
translation and shearing attacks, it also only causes pixel position displacements.
Because pM(i) is irrelevant to the pixel positions, pM(i) is insensitive to rotation,
translation, shearing and aﬃne attacks.
Under a cropping attack, parts of the host image will be removed, which can
cause de-synchronization problem for many watermarking schemes. If the cropping
rate is very small, apparently the PPVD will not be signiﬁcantly aﬀected. If the
cropping rate is large, the PPVD of the cut part will be similar to the the original
CHAPTER 4. MOMENT BASED METHOD ROBUST TO CROPPING 79
one [48]. Assume a number of nM3 N
M pixels are cropped, then
N ′M = NM − nM3 NM
= RC − nM3 RC. (4.18)
According to the similarity mentioned above, for each hM(i) a number of nM3 h
M(i)
pixels are cropped. So we can have
h′M(i) = hM(i)− nM3 hM(i). (4.19)
Considering the deﬁnition of pM(i) together with (4.18) and (4.19), we have
p′M(i) =
h′M(i)
R′C ′
=
hM(i)− nM3 hM(i)
RC − nM3 RC
=
(1− nM3 )hM(i)
(1− nM3 )RC
= pM(i). (4.20)
Hence, cropping will not cause signiﬁcant change to the PPVD thus has little
impact on pM(i). Fig. 4.8 shows the PPVDs of the original image Lena and its
counterparts after rotation, scaling and cropping attacks, versus diﬀerent pixel val-
ues. We can see from Fig. 4.8 that these PPVDs curves are almost identical. This
means that PPVD is insensitive to these attacks. Note that the proposed moment
based method is not robust against luminance change or histogram equalization,
which is also a general problem in other moment based methods. However, since
the proposed method focuses on the resistance to geometric attacks, it is more
suitable for applications where geometric attacks present.
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4.3.2 Perceptual quality evaluation
In this chapter, the PSNR index is adopted to evaluate the perceptual quality of
the watermarked image. As mentioned in Chapter 2, PSNR can be formulated as
PSNR = 10 log10
MAX2
MSE
(4.21)
where MAX is the maximum possible pixel value of the image, which is 255 for a
8-bit gray scale image, and MSE is the mean squared error, which can be deﬁned
as
MSE =
1
RC
R−1∑
xM=0
C−1∑
yM=0
[I(xM , yM)− IW (xM , yM)]2. (4.22)
According to (4.21), the equation can be further modiﬁed as
PSNR = 10 log10MAX
2 − 10 log10MSE. (4.23)
Since 10 log10MAX
2 is a constant, the PSNR will be aﬀected by MSE only. As
in the watermark embedding stage, we know that for a watermarked pixel, the
diﬀerence between the original pixel value and the watermarked pixel value will
be S
M
2
without considering βM . Denote hMLM (i) as the number of pixels in the ith
bin, we can rewrite (4.22) as
MSE =
(
SM
2
)2
1
2RC
LM−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + 1)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + SM)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
]
. (4.24)
Since SM is a power of 2 as above-mentioned, we set SM = 2k
M
, where kM =
1, 2, . . . , 7. Then we can have
MSE =
22k
M
8RC
LM−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + 1)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣+ · · ·
+
∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + SM)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
]
. (4.25)
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Substitute (4.25) into (4.23), then
PSNR = 10 log10MAX
2
−10 log10
⎛
⎝LM−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + 1)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + SM)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
])
+10 log10 (8RC)− 10 log10
(
22k
M
)
= AM1 − [20 log10 (2)] kM (4.26)
where
AM1 = 10 log10MAX
2 + 10log10 (8RC)
−10 log10
⎛
⎝LM−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + 1)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣∣hM(zSM + SM)− hMLM (z + 1)SM
∣∣∣∣
])
. (4.27)
From (4.26) we can see that the relationship between the PSNR and SM can
be approximately described by a straight line with a negative slope. And the
simulation result shown in Fig. 4.3 also supports the analysis. Note that when SM
is small, the value of f ′M(ΨM∗) will be unstable after attacks due to the lack of pixel
values in one bin, which will lead to a poor robustness performance. When SM is
large, the perceptual quality will degrade signiﬁcantly. Given that the watermark
is not visually perceptible when PSNR is greater than 40 dB [41], kM = 3 or
4 will be suitable for the proposed scheme, which compromised robustness and
perceptual quality.
Now we investigate how βM is going to aﬀect the perceptual quality. Before
applying βM , we have already modiﬁed the host image to a certain extend. Denote
the modiﬁed image as IM , we ﬁrst analyze the perceptual quality degradation
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Figure 4.3: The relationship between the PSNR and SM .
introduced by βM on IM . This time a pixel’s value will be modiﬁed by SM .
Denote hMGM (i) = h
M
LM (2i− 1) + hMLM (2i), i = 1, . . . , GM . Similar to (4.24), we can
have
MSE =
βM
(
SM
)2
RC
LM/2−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + 1)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣+ · · ·
+
∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + 2SM)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣
]
. (4.28)
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By substituting (4.28) into (4.23), we can get
PSNR = 10 log10MAX
2
−10 log10
⎛
⎝LM/2−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + 1)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + SM)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣
])
−10 log10
((
SM
)2
RC
)
− 10 log10
(
βM
)
= AM2 − 10 log10
(
βM
)
(4.29)
where
AM2 = 10 log10MAX
2 − 10 log10
((
SM
)2
RC
)
−10 log10
⎛
⎝LM/2−1∑
z=0
[∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + 1)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣∣hM(2zSM + SM)− hMGM (z + 1)2SM
∣∣∣∣
])
. (4.30)
By ﬁxing the value of SM , it can be observed that AM2 is a constant. Hence PSNR
can be expressed by a logarithm function of βM . The relationship between the
PSNR and βM for IM is shown in Fig. 4.4 when kM = 3. We can see that the
theoretical curve matches the simulation curve, which supports the analysis above.
Finally we investigate the relationship between the PSNR and βM for I. When
kM = 3, from the simulation results shown in Fig. 4.5 we can observe that as
βM growing, the PSNR of I is lower than the PSNR for IM . This is because the
equalization process within one bin and the ﬁnal modiﬁcation within one group
are implemented independently. Since the pixels modiﬁed in both processes are
randomly chosen, it is possible that a pixel which is modiﬁed in the equalization
step is modiﬁed in the ﬁnal modiﬁcation. As a result, the modiﬁcation amount in
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Figure 4.4: The relationship between the PSNR and βM for IM .
(4.28) will not be ﬁxed to SM anymore. It can be 3
2
SM , SM or 1
2
SM . Regarding
to the property of PSNR, it is more sensitive to large distortions than small ones
because of the square. Therefore, the PSNR of I will be a little bit smaller than the
theoretical analysis. However, (4.29) still indicates the trend of PSNR degradation
with the growing of βM . And from Fig. 4.4 we can see that it is good to choose
βM ≤ 0.4 in order to achieve a better perceptual quality.
4.4 Experimental Results
In the experiments, we applied several common attacks to the well-known images
Lena, Barbara, Cameraman and Boat to test the robustness of the proposed wa-
termarking method, in comparison with the method in [39] and the method in [41].
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Table 4.2: εM of the proposed method under common attacks
Attack
εM
Lena Barbara Cameraman Boat
Median Filtering 0.0271 0.0571 0.2312 0.1400
JPEG 20% 0.0296 0.0910 0.0741 0.0953
Gaussian Noise 0.0196 0.1444 0.1257 0.1125
Salt & Pepper Noise 0.0630 0.1295 0.0014 0.0066
Rotation 45◦ 0.1135 0.0146 0.0291 0.0043
Scaling 80% 0.0618 0.0387 0.0940 0.0685
Aﬃne1 0.0604 0.0636 0.1362 0.0302
Aﬃne2 0.0433 0.0999 0.0902 0.0845
Cropping 10% 0.0852 0.0552 0.0419 0.0142
Cropping 20% 0.1330 0.0977 0.0082 0.0084
Cropping 30% 0.1784 0.0827 0.0825 0.0516
By exploiting the aﬃne geometric moment invariants, [39] modiﬁes the moment
invariants into a predeﬁned interval in order to tackle rotation, scaling and trans-
lation attacks. In [41], an orthogonal Legendre moment invariant is employed to
cope with aﬃne attacks. The attacks we used include ﬁltering, JPEG compression,
noise, rotation, scaling, aﬃne, and cropping attacks. The two aﬃne attacks were
generated by MATLAB using two transform matrices⎡
⎣1.1 0.1
0.2 0.8
⎤
⎦ and
⎡
⎣−1.2 0.4
0.3 −0.6
⎤
⎦ .
Note that a larger kM and a smaller βM would result in a better robustness against
attacks, but the perceptual quality will be degraded signiﬁcantly. In order to
balance the imperceptibility and the robustness, we set kM as 3, 4, 4, 3 and βM
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Table 4.3: Robustness of the proposed method, the method in [39] and the method
in [41] against common attacks
Attack
Detection rate
Proposed Method Method in [39] Method in [41]
Median Filtering 0.75 0 0.75
JPEG 20% 1 1 1
Gaussian Noise 1 1 1
Salt & Pepper Noise 1 1 1
Rotation 45◦ 1 1 1
Scaling 80% 1 1 1
Aﬃne1 1 1 1
Aﬃne2 1 1 1
Cropping 10% 1 0 0
Cropping 20% 1 0 0
Cropping 30% 1 0 0
as 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2 for images Lena, Barbara, Cameraman and Boat, respectively.
The PSNR we achieved for these four images are 52 dB, 44 dB, 49 dB and 51 dB,
respectively. For a fair comparison, we use the original settings in [39] and in [41]
to achieve the PSNR values of 40 dB. The experimental results are shown in Table
4.2 and Table 4.3. In Table 4.2, the εMs for the proposed method under various
attacks are shown. From Table 4.3, we can observe that the proposed method is
robust to common signal processing and geometric attacks, especially cropping.
It is known [39] that traditional moment base methods are sensitive to cropping
attack and they will usually fail if the cropping rate is more than 5%. In contrast,
the proposed method still works when the cropping rate has reached 30%. The
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Figure 4.5: The relationship between the PSNR and βM for I.
reason is that PPVD is adopted in the proposed watermarking method. As we
have shown before, PPVD is insensitive to cropping.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Traditional moment base image watermarking schemes are robust to common sig-
nal processing attacks and some geometric attacks but they are highly vulnerable
to cropping attack. In this chapter, the moment base watermarking approach is
modiﬁed to tackle cropping attack. In the proposed watermarking method, PPVD
is ﬁrst extracted from the original image and then reshaped and normalized to
generate a PPVD image. Based on the obtained PPVD image, the moment in-
variants are calculated and used in watermark embedding and detection. Since
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PPVD is robust to cropping, the proposed method shows good resistance to crop-
ping, as well as other common signal processing attacks and geometric attacks.
Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed method. This method is designed for a large ﬁeld of applications where
signal processing attacks and geometric attacks may occur, especially cropping,
and where one only needs to detect the existence of the watermark, like program
monitoring.
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(a) Original Lena (b) Original Barbara
(c) Original Cameraman (d) Original Boat
(e) Watermarked Lena (f) Watermarked Barbara
(g) Watermarked Cameraman (h) Watermarked Boat
Figure 4.6: The images Lena, Barbara, Cameraman and Boat and their water-
marked counterparts. (a)-(d) Original. (e)-(h) Watermarked.
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Figure 4.7: Enlarged original image Lena and its watermarked counterpart.
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(d) Cropping 10%
Figure 4.8: PPVDs of the image Lena before and after attacks. (a) Original, (b)
rotation 5◦, (c) scaling 80%, and (d) cropping 10%.
Chapter 5
Robust Histogram Shape Based
Method
An one-bit moment based image watermarking method which is robust to geo-
metric attacks is proposed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we focus on
developing an image watermarking method with higher embedding capacity while
robust to both signal processing and geometric attacks. The histogram shape of
an image is invariant to pixel position shifting and insensitive to cropping, thus
having potential to be exploited to tackle cropping attacks and RBAs. However,
the traditional histogram based image watermarking methods [48]-[50] do not ex-
plicitly employ the histogram shape of the image. Instead, they use the mean
of the histogram to select gray levels in a certain range and use the pixels corre-
sponding to these gray levels to form pixel groups for watermark embedding. A
common drawback of these methods is that many potential pixel groups which
could contain more pixels are not formed and utilized for watermark embedding,
which compromises their robustness. In this chapter, we propose a histogram
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based image watermarking method, where the histogram shape of image is explic-
itly exploited in watermark embedding and decoding. At the embedding phase, a
Gaussian low-pass ﬁlter is ﬁrst applied to the host image to extract the image fea-
ture robust to signal processing attacks. Then, we construct the histogram of the
ﬁltered image in relation to a number of gray levels randomly selected by using a
secret key. Instead of using histogram mean as in [48]-[50], we deﬁne a histogram-
shape-related index to select pixel groups with the highest number of pixels and
propose to build a safe band between the selected and non-selected pixel groups,
which will be beneﬁcial to robustness. A watermark bit is inserted into a selected
group by moving some pixels to certain gray levels within the pixel group. At the
decoding phase, by using the secret key, one can ﬁnd the watermarked pixel groups
from the received image and then extract watermarks from them. Compared to
other histogram-based watermarking methods such as those in [48]-[50], the major
contributions of our proposed method are the propositions of a new histogram-
shape-related index for pixel group selection, an eﬃcient implementation of secret
key for security concern, a new pixel transfer approach to reduce the extent of pixel
movements, and a safe band to create an error buﬀer between the selected and
non-selected pixel groups. The performance of the proposed image watermarking
method is illustrated by simulation examples and compared with recent works.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly the proposed wa-
termark embedding and detection algorithms are introduced. After that, the geo-
metric invariant property is discussed. Then the simulation results are provided to
show the superior performance of our method, in terms of perceptual quality and
robustness against common attacks. The selection of parameter of the proposed
method is also discussed with the simulation results. Finally, concluding remarks
are presented.
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5.1 Watermark Embedding Process
The watermark embedding process of the proposed method consists of four steps:
Gaussian ﬁltering, histogram construction, and pixel group selection.
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram of watermark embedding process.
5.1.1 Gaussian ﬁltering
It is known [48], [57] that robustness to common signal processing attacks can
be achieved by embedding watermarks into the low-frequency component of an
image. Thus, we ﬁrst pre-process the host gray scale image I by a 2-D Gaussian
low-pass ﬁlter
F(x, y, σ) =
1
2πσ2
e−
x2+y2
2σ2 (5.1)
where (x, y) denotes the position of the pixel and σ is the standard deviation of
the distribution, which is usually chosen as σ = 1 [48]. The ﬁltered image Ilow can
be expressed as
Ilow(x, y) = F(x, y, σ) ∗ I(x, y) (5.2)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator. If Ihigh stands for the high-frequency
component removed by the Gaussian ﬁltering from the host image I, it follows
Ihigh(x, y) = I(x, y)− Ilow(x, y). (5.3)
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In practice, the size of the Gaussian mask F is often chosen using expression
(2kσ + 1) × (2kσ + 1), where k is a positive integer. Since 99.7% energy of the
Gaussian distribution is concentrated within 3 standard deviations from the mean,
we can set k to be 3. Thus the size of the Gaussian mask F used in this chapter
is 7× 7.
5.1.2 Histogram construction
Assume that the ﬁltered image Ilow has K gray levels, e.g., an 8-bit gray scale
image has K = 256 gray levels, ranging from 0 to 255. The histogram of an image
illustrates the number of pixels versus the gray level values. Clearly, the shape of
the histogram is related to the image content. In order to introduce security into
our method, a pseudonoise (PN) sequence p = [p(1), p(2), . . . , p(K)] of length K
is used as a security key to randomly select S gray levels from the K available
gray levels, where
K/2 ≤ S < K. (5.4)
Each element of p randomly takes an integer from the range [0, K − 1], where
p(i) 	= p(j) if i 	= j. Denoting the S selected gray levels by K1, K2, . . . , KS, the
ith selected gray level Ki is given by Ki = p(i). Then, we construct the histogram
of the image Ilow by
hS = {hS(Ki)|i = 1, 2, . . . , S} (5.5)
where hS(Ki) is the number of pixels corresponding to gray level Ki.
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5.1.3 Pixel group selection
After constructing the histogram hS, we take each LB neighboring gray levels in
hS to form a bin. In total, one can form
MB =
⌊
S
LB
⌋
(5.6)
bins. It is easy to ﬁnd that the number of pixels in the ith bin is
hB(i) = hS
(
K(i−1)·LB+1
)
+ hS
(
K(i−1)·LB+2
)
+ · · ·hS (Ki·LB) (5.7)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,MB. Further, we take each two neighboring bins to form a
group, which will yield
⌊
MB
2
⌋
groups. For the ith group, the two bins (called
Bin 1 and Bin 2) contain hB(2i − 1) and hB(2i) pixels, respectively, where i =
1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
MB
2
⌋
. Thus, the number of pixels in the ith group is
hG(i) = hB(2i− 1) + hB(2i), i = 1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
MB
2
⌋
. (5.8)
Next, we select the pixel groups that are suitable for hiding watermarks. Let NS
be the total number of pixels corresponding to the S selected gray levels, i.e.,
NS =
S∑
i=1
hS(Ki). (5.9)
To make the selection of pixel groups adaptive to the histogram shape, we propose
a pixel group selection criterion based on the ratio between hG(i) and NS, i.e.,
based on
g(i) =
hG(i)
NS
(5.10)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
MB
2
⌋
. As shown later, g(i) in (5.10) is insensitive to common
geometric attacks, including cropping attacks and RBAs, which is essential to
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tackling geometric attacks. If g(i) is greater than a predetermined threshold TG,
the ith pixel group is considered to be suitable for watermark embedding. The
threshold TG balances robustness and embedding rate. The larger TG, the higher
robustness due to more pixels in the group but the lower embedding rate as fewer
pixel groups will be chosen for watermark embedding. In this chapter, TG is
empirically chosen as
TG =
Total number of image pixels
4LB
. (5.11)
We assume without loss of generality that LG pixel groups are suitable for embed-
ding watermarks, where
LG ≤
⌊
MB
2
⌋
. (5.12)
Denote the number of watermarks to be embedded by LW . If LW = LG, all of the
LG pixel groups will be chosen to embed watermarks. If LW < LG, the LW pixel
groups with the highest g(i) values will be chosen to embed the LW watermarks.
In the watermark decoding process, the g(i) values will be estimated from the
post-attack watermarked image, and then used to identify the LW pixel groups
containing watermarks. Although g(i) in (5.10) is insensitive to common geometric
attacks, it could be changed to some extent after attacks, which will lead to errors
in identifying the watermarked pixel groups. To minimize this unwanted situation
from happening, in the following, we introduce a safe band for g(i) between the
LW chosen pixel groups and the non-chosen pixel groups in the embedding process.
Let gmin be the minimum g(i) value among the LW chosen pixel groups. We set
the width of the safe band to be α · gmin, where α is a factor which controls the
strength of the safe band. The safe band is implemented as follows. For each
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non-chosen group, if the corresponding g(i) satisﬁes
(1− α) · gmin < g(i) < gmin (5.13)
we randomly pick up [g(i)− (1− α) · gmin] · NS pixels in this non-chosen group.
Then we change the gray level values of these pixels such that they fall into the
nearest chosen group. After this modiﬁcation, the g(i) value of the corresponding
non-chosen group reduces to no more than gmin − α · gmin. This forms the safe
band of width α ·gmin. At watermark decoding end, this group-level safe band will
signiﬁcantly diminishes the chance of classifying non-watermarked pixel groups as
watermarked pixel groups. We would like to note that while increasing α improves
the robustness, it will degrade the perceptual quality as a larger α generally results
in more pixel modiﬁcations. We will discuss how to empirically choose a suitable
α value later in this chapter.
5.1.4 Watermark embedding
Assume that w1, w2, . . . , wLW are the watermark bits to be embedded into the LW
chosen groups, respectively. It is known that each chosen group, say the ith group,
is composed of two bins: Bin 1 containing hB(2i− 1) pixels and Bin 2 containing
hB(2i) pixels. Then, one can embed the watermark bit wi into the ith chosen
group by using the following embedding rule:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
hB(2i−1)
hB(2i)
≥ 2, if wi = 1
hB(2i−1)
hB(2i)
≤ 1
2
, if wi = 0
. (5.14)
The above embedding rule implies that if wi = 1, a certain number of pixels (say
N1) should be transferred from Bin 2 to Bin 1 such that hB(2i − 1) ≥ 2hB(2i).
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Similarly, if wi = 0, some pixels (say N0) need to be transferred from Bin 1 to
Bin 2 such that hB(2i− 1) ≤ 12hB(2i). The minimum N0 and N1 are⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
N0 =
2hB(2i−1)−hB(2i)
3
N1 =
2hB(2i)−hB(2i−1)
3
. (5.15)
Clearly, the way of transferring pixels will have direct impact on perceptual qual-
ity. In order to reduce the perceptual quality degradation, the amount of pixel
value changes during the pixel transfer should be small. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that we would like to embed watermark bit “0” into the ith
group. This requires us to transfer no less than N0 pixels from Bin 1 into Bin 2
within this group. Referring to (5.7), the LB gray levels in Bin 1 are K(i−1)·LB+1,
K(i−1)·LB+2,. . ., Ki·LB and those in Bin 2 are Ki·LB+1, Ki·LB+2,. . ., K(i+1)·LB . De-
note the numbers of pixels at these gray levels by NK(i−1)·LB+1 , NK(i−1)·LB+2 ,. . .,
NK(i+1)·LB , respectively. For the methods in [48] and [50], the N0 pixels are ran-
domly selected from the gray levels K(i−1)·LB+1, K(i−1)·LB+2,. . ., Ki·LB in Bin 1 and
then moved to the gray levels Ki·LB+1, Ki·LB+2,. . ., K(i+1)·LB in Bin 2, respectively.
That is, all selected pixels will jump at least LB gray levels to reach the new des-
tinations, which means considerable changes to the gray level values of all selected
pixels. This will have negative impact on perceptual quality.
Here, we propose a new pixel transfer approach to reduce the extent of pixel
movements. Our approach considers the following two cases.
• Case 1: If NKi·LB+1 ≥ N0, move N0 pixels from gray level Ki·LB+1 to gray
level Ki·LB+2 within Bin 2. Then select N0 pixels from Bin 1 as follows:
– If NKi·LB ≥ N0, choose all N0 pixels from gray level Ki·LB .
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– If NKi·LB < N0, then choose NKi·LB pixels from gray level Ki·LB and the
remaining N0 − NKi·LB pixels are chosen from the other gray levels in
Bin 1.
The pixels selected in Bin 1 are moved to gray level Ki·LB+1 in Bin 2.
• Case 2: If NKi·LB+1 < N0, move all NKi·LB+1 pixels from gray level Ki·LB+1
to gray level Ki·LB+2. Then select N0 pixels from the LB gray levels in Bin 1
in the way described in Case 1. Among these selected pixels, move the ﬁrst
NKi·LB+1 pixels to gray level Ki·LB+1 and the remaining N0−NKi·LB+1 pixels
to gray level Ki·LB+2.
Fig. 5.2 shows an example illustrating how to transfer pixels from Bin 1 to Bin 2
in Case 1. Here, for the sake of illustrative simplicity, we assume i = 1 and LB = 3.
In this scenario, the gray levels in Bin 1 are K1, K2, K3 and the gray levels in Bin 2
are K4, K5, K6.
One can see that in our approach, many selected pixels are only shifted to the next
gray level. This means that the modiﬁcations on these pixels are minimum, which
is beneﬁcial to improving perceptual quality. It should be noted that although
the above example only shows how to embed watermark bit “0” into group 1, the
approach can be easily extended to embed any watermark bit into any selected
pixel group.
5.2 Watermark decoding process
The watermark decoding process is shown in Fig. 5.3, which involves Gaussian
ﬁltering, histogram construction, identiﬁcation of watermarked groups, and water-
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of transferring pixels from Bin 1 to Bin 2, where i = 1,
LB = 3, the horizontal axis denotes gray level, and the vertical axis denotes the
number of pixels. (a) Original state. (b) Transfer pixels from gray level K4 to
gray level K5. (c) Transfer pixels from gray levels K1, K2, K3 to gray level K4.
(d) Final state.
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mark extraction.
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Figure 5.3: Block diagram of watermark decoding process.
• Gaussian ﬁltering: Since Gaussian low-pass ﬁlter is not invariant to scaling
attacks, the dimension of the 7 × 7 Gaussian mask used in the embedding
process may be varied in the received image I′ after scaling attacks. Hence,
same as the method in [48], a σ based matching scheme is employed to
determine the size of the Gaussian mask to be used in the decoding process.
The obtained Gaussian mask is applied to I′ to extract the corresponding
low-frequency component I′low.
• Histogram construction: Based on the security key, ﬁnd the S gray levels
K1, K2, . . . , KS used for watermark embedding, from the K possible gray
levels. Then construct the histogram of I′low, denoted as h
′
S, by mimicking
(5.5).
• Identiﬁcation of watermarked groups: Take each LB neighboring gray levels
in H ′S to form a bin and take each two neighboring bins as a group. Compute
the number of pixels in each bin, h′B(i), and that in each group, h
′
G(i), by
referring to (5.7) and (5.8), respectively. After that, calculate N ′S and then
g′(i) by imitating (5.9) and (5.10), respectively. The LW groups with the
highest g′(i) values are identiﬁed as watermarked groups.
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• Watermark extraction: For the ith watermarked group, h′B(2i−1) and h′B(2i)
denote the number of pixels in the ﬁrst bin and that in the second bin,
respectively. If h′B(2i − 1)/h′B(2i) ≥ 1, the extracted watermark bit is “1”;
Otherwise, watermark bit “0” is extracted.
Remark 3: In the proposed method, without knowing the secret key at the decoding
end, an oﬀender needs to search CSK times to extract watermarks. For example,
if K = 256 (i.e., the image is an 8-bit gray scale image) and S is set to be 246,
then CSK = C
246
256 ≈ 2.7883 × 1017. Lowering the value of S can further enhance
security. In contrast, estimating the watermark sequences in [48] and [50] without
authorization is easy, and the method in [49] does not use any security measure.
So our method is much more secure than those methods in [48]-[50].
Remark 4: Since the proposed watermarking method exploits the histogram shape
of an image, it does not perform well against attacks which can signiﬁcantly change
the histogram shape, such as brightness, contrast or gamma modiﬁcation. This is a
common issue for all histogram base watermarking methods and majority of other
watermarking methods. While the watermarking methods in [128] and [129] are
designed to resist this type of attacks, they are vulnerable to geometric attacks.
So, the proposed watermarking method is particularly suitable for applications
where geometric attacks are of primary concern.
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(a) Barbara (b) Calculator (c) Conch
(d) Desk (e) Elaine
(f) Lena (g) Office (h) Peppers
(i) Pirate (j) Venice
Figure 5.4: Original images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce,
Peppers, Pirate and Venice.
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(k) Watermarked
Barbara
(l) Watermarked
Calculator
(m) Watermarked
Conch
(n) Watermarked
Desk
(o) Watermarked
Elaine
(p) Watermarked
Lena
(q) Watermarked
Office
(r) Watermarked
Peppers
(s) Watermarked
Pirate
(t) Watermarked
Venice
Figure 5.5: Watermarked counterparts of images Barbara, Calculator, Conch,
Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce, Peppers, Pirate and Venice, where LW = LG.
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5.3 Approximate insensitivity of g(i) to common
geometric attacks
Assume that the host image I has N = RC pixels, where R and C denote the num-
ber of rows and columns of the image, respectively. The parameters hG(i), NS and
g(i) related to the host image I are deﬁned in (5.8)-(5.10), respectively. For the im-
age undergoing geometric attacks, the corresponding symbols and parameters are
I′, N ′, R′, C ′, h′G(i), N
′
S and g
′(i), respectively. Note that after geometric attacks,
an interpolation process is generally needed for images [130]. The interpolation
process will introduce interpolation errors such as aliasing, blocking and blurring
[130]. However, in order to maintain the perceptual quality of the attacked image
to an acceptable level, the errors introduced by interpolations are often small [48]
and thus will be ignored in the following analysis.
We ﬁrst consider scaling attack with scaling factor a1 and a2 in vertical and hori-
zontal directions, respectively. After scaling, R′ = a1R and C ′ = a2C, which lead
to
N ′ = R′C ′
= a1a2N. (5.16)
Similar to (5.16), we can get
h′G(i) = a1a2hG(i) (5.17)
and
N ′S = a1a2NS. (5.18)
Considering the deﬁnition of g(i) together with (5.17) and (5.18), ignoring the
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interpolation errors we have
g′(i) =
h′G(i)
N ′S
=
a1a2hG(i)
a1a2NS
= g(i). (5.19)
This means that g(i) is invariant to scaling attacks.
Then we consider rotation, translation, shearing and aﬃne attacks. It is obvious
that rotation and translation only make the pixels change their positions. Under a
shearing attack, the image will be stretched, which will only shift the positions of
the pixels. Similarly, aﬃne transform also only causes pixel position displacements
as it can be regarded as a combination of scaling, rotation, translation and shearing
attacks. Since g(i) is dependent on the histogram shape and the latter is irrelevant
to the pixel positions, g(i) is insensitive to rotation, translation, shearing and aﬃne
attacks.
Under a cropping attack, parts of the host image will be removed, which can
cause de-synchronization problem for many watermarking schemes [70]. Strictly
speaking, the degree of insensitivity of g(i) under cropping attacks depends on
the image, the cropped area and the function for selecting the S gray levels. Al-
though the “invariance” property of the histogram shape of an image to crop-
ping attacks is an approximate invariance, it holds reasonably well for most nat-
ural images in practice. We tested the insensitivity of g(i) under 30% cropping
attack by using 100 randomly selected images, including street view, satellite,
plant, animal, biomedical, portrait, landscape, geological, underwater, architec-
ture, military, indoor and kitchenware images, from the online image database
http://decsai.ugr.es/cvg/index2.php. For each image, we selected the 25 largest
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g(i) values. Thus, we considered 2500 g(i) values in total. Denote the absolute
relative variation of g(i) as the ratio between the absolute diﬀerence of g(i) caused
by cropping and the g(i) before cropping. We computed the average absolute
relative variations of g(i) caused by 30% cropping. The average absolute relative
variations of g(i) under 30% cropping is 5.3%, which is relatively small. In the
proposed method, a safe band which will be introduced in the encoding process
later is 15%, much greater than 5.3%, so our method is robust to cropping attacks.
A RBA normally uses diﬀerent transformation parameters for diﬀerent parts of
the image. So, it is very diﬃcult to estimate the transformation parameters used
in the attack and apply inverse transformations to the attacked image. The main
eﬀect of a RBA on an image is local warping, which is a kind of pixel position
shifting. Since histogram shape is invariant to pixel positions, g(i) is insensitive
to RBAs.
5.4 Simulation results
In this section, we evaluate the perceptual quality and robustness of the proposed
method by simulations, in comparison with the methods in [48]-[50]. Ten standard
8-bit gray scale images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce,
Peppers, Pirate and Venice are used as host images in the simulations, which
are shown in Fig. 5.4. For each image, two diﬀerent embedding rates are used:
i) The number of watermark bits is LW = 25. ii) The number of watermark
bits is LW = LG, where LG is the maximum number of watermark bits that
can be embedded into the image. The LG values of these images are all greater
than 25 (i.e., LG > 25) and the average LG value is 30. Perceptual quality is
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measured by the PSNR index and the SSIM index. The larger PSNR or SSIM
value, the better perceptual quality. Robustness is measured by the BER index and
smaller BER value indicates better robustness. The robustness of our method and
the methods in [48]-[50] is compared in the absence of attacks and under various
signal processing attacks (including median ﬁltering, JPEG, Gaussian noise, and
salt & pepper noise) and geometric attacks (including rotation, scaling, shearing,
cropping, and random bending). These attacks are generated by programs written
in MATLAB codes [131]-[133] and the eﬀects of attacks on images are illustrated
in Fig. 5.7. The performance indices PSNR, SSIM and BER are calculated by
averaging the results obtained from the ten images.
Selection of α
For the proposed method, we set S = 246 and LB = 3. Regarding the parameter α,
we here empirically investigate their inﬂuence on perceptual quality and robustness
using the afore-mentioned host images, which will facilitate the selection of α.
As mentioned before, α controls the strength of the safe band and consequently
the robustness. A larger α improves the robustness. On the other hand, increasing
α results in more pixel modiﬁcations and thus has more negative impact on the
perceptual quality. Fig. 5.8(a) shows how α aﬀects the perceptual quality of
the proposed method with LW = 25. Fig. 5.8(b) shows the inﬂuence of α on
the robustness of our method under various attacks including closed-loop, median
ﬁltering 5 × 5, JPEG 30%, Gaussian noise with variance 10, salt & pepper noise
with variance 10, rotation 25%, scaling 80%, shearing 10%, cropping 10%, global
bending with factor 10, high-frequency bending with factor 1 and jittering 1%.
Since median ﬁltering is a low-pass ﬁltering, it can severely change the pixel values
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of most pixels. On the other hand, geometric attacks only introduce interpolation
errors, which will not result in signiﬁcant changes in the pixel values. Therefore,
the error of median ﬁltering is larger than the other attacks. We can see that
when α is greater than 0.15, further increasing α only yields small improvement
on robustness but causes considerable perceptual quality degradation. Hence, in
order to achieve high robustness while maintaining a good perceptual quality, we
empirically choose α = 0.15.
Table 5.1: PSNRs and SSIMs of the proposed method, where LW = 25 and LW =
LG, respectively.
Perceptual quality metrics LW = 25 LW = LG
PSNR (dB) 51.83 51.14
SSIM 0.982 0.981
5.4.1 Perceptual Quality
Table 5.1 shows the PSNRs and SSIMs of the proposed watermarking method
under LW . As expected, with the increase of LW , perceptual quality slightly
decreases. The reason is that to embed more watermark bits, more pixel groups will
be used. This means that more pixels will be modiﬁed, which reduces perceptual
quality.
It is mentioned in [41] that the PSNR of 40 dB indicates good perceptual quality,
whilst [75] uses the SSIM value of 0.9. Since the PSNRs (resp. SSIMs) obtained
by our method are well above 40 dB (resp. 0.9), the watermarked images will be
of good quality. For example, Fig. 5.5 shows the watermarked counterparts of the
images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce, Peppers, Pirate
and Venice by our method, where LW = LG (which yield a PSNR of 51.14 dB
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Table 5.2: BERs of the proposed method and the methods in [48]-[50] under
common attacks, where LW = 25.
Attacks Proposed method Method in [48] Method in [49] Method in [50]
Closed-loop 0.006 0.050 0 0.074
Median ﬁltering 0.056 0.091 0 0.118
JPEG 10% 0.201 0.212 0.490 0.245
JPEG 30% 0.007 0.061 0.485 0.199
Gaussian noise 0.027 0.071 0.473 0.146
Salt & pepper noise 0.006 0.050 0 0.074
Rotation 10◦ 0.025 0.075 0.267 0.228
Rotation 25◦ 0.033 0.083 0.307 0.230
Scaling 80% 0.028 0.073 0.283 0.234
Scaling 120% 0.027 0.060 0.240 0.204
Shearing 10% 0.024 0.064 0.039 0.206
Cropping 10% 0.006 0.060 0 0.053
Cropping 20% 0.009 0.138 0 0.073
Cropping 30% 0.019 0.142 0 0.076
Global bending 0.025 0.071 0.056 0.197
high-frequency bending 0.008 0.050 0 0.083
Jittering 1% 0.007 0.053 0 0.076
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and an SSIM of 0.981, as show in Table 5.1). Clearly, there is no visual diﬀerence
between the original images and their watermarked versions. For the illustration
purpose, in Fig. 5.6 we enlarge the original image Lena from Fig. 5.4 and its
watermarked counterpart Fig. 5.5 to demonstrate the good perceptual quality of
our proposed method.
5.4.2 Robustness
Table 5.2 shows the BERs of the four watermarking methods against common
attacks, where each image is embedded LW = 25 watermark bits. We note that
our method has much higher perceptual quality than the other methods. For
example, the PSNR and SSIM indices of the proposed method are (PSNR =
51.83 dB, SSIM = 0.982), while those of the methods in [48]-[50] are (PSNR =
44.26 dB, SSIM = 0.932), (PSNR = 44.59 dB, SSIM = 0.938) and (PSNR =
43.75 dB, SSIM = 0.937), respectively. This ensures that the comparison is fair.
From Table 5.2, we can see that the proposed method is robust against common
attacks. This good performance results from two factors: Firstly, the pixel groups
employed to embed watermarks in our method contain more pixels than those in
[48]-[50] do, thanks to the usage of the pixel group selection criterion based on
histogram shape. Secondly, in the new method, a safe band is built between the
pixel groups selected for watermark embedding and the non-selected pixel groups,
while the methods in [48]-[50] do not have.
Table 5.3 shows the BERs of the four methods when the number of watermark bits
embedded into an image is increased to LW = LG. Again, all four methods have
much higher perceptual quality than that of the other methods. From Table 5.3,
it can be seen that the proposed method achieves satisfactory robustness under
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all attacks. In contrast, the methods in [48]-[50] do not perform very well under
most attacks.
Table 5.3: BERs of the proposed method and the methods in [48]-[50] under
common attacks, where LW = LG.
Attacks Proposed method Method in [48] Method in [49] Method in [50]
Closed-loop 0.020 0.066 0 0.081
Median ﬁltering 0.099 0.112 0 0.121
JPEG 10% 0.236 0.244 0.493 0.251
JPEG 30% 0.033 0.082 0.496 0.232
Gaussian noise 0.058 0.096 0.476 0.189
Salt & pepper noise 0.023 0.066 0 0.086
Rotation 10◦ 0.071 0.091 0.268 0.237
Rotation 25◦ 0.073 0.106 0.310 0.251
Scaling 80% 0.066 0.093 0.297 0.249
Scaling 120% 0.065 0.080 0.241 0.226
Shearing 10% 0.059 0.084 0.062 0.242
Cropping 10% 0.029 0.080 0 0.073
Cropping 20% 0.036 0.160 0 0.083
Cropping 30% 0.048 0.162 0 0.083
Global bending 0.061 0.091 0.071 0.227
high-frequency bending 0.035 0.069 0 0.087
Jittering 1% 0.031 0.068 0 0.086
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we propose a new image watermarking method that is robust to
common attacks. To deal with signal processing attacks, a Gaussian low-pass ﬁlter
is employed to pre-process the host image such that watermarks will only be em-
bedded into the low-frequency component of the host image. To tackle geometric
attacks (including cropping attack and RBAs), a histogram-shape-related index is
utilized to form and select the most suitable pixel groups for watermark embed-
ding. Besides, a safe band is introduced between the selected pixel groups and
the non-selected pixel groups to improve robustness to geometric attacks. Due to
the usage of secret key, the proposed watermarking method is also secure. The
superior performance of the proposed method is demonstrated by simulation re-
sults. Similar to the moment based method proposed in the previous chapter, this
method can also handle signal processing attacks and geometric attacks simultane-
ously. Diﬀerent from the one-bit algorithm, this method can embed multiple bits
and thus it can be more widely utilized in the applications where the robustness
against attacks, especially cropping and RBAs, is of primary concerns.
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Figure 5.6: Enlarged original image Lena and its watermarked counterpart.
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(a) Original (b) Median Filter (c) JPEG
(d) Gaussian Noise (e) Salt & Pepper Noise (f) Rotation
(g) Scaling (h) Shearing (i) Cropping
(j) Global Bending 
with Factor 10
(k) High−Frequency Bending 
with Factor 1 (l) Random Jittering
Figure 5.7: Illustration of attacks. (a) Original; (b) Median ﬁlter; (c) JPEG; (d)
Gaussian noise; (e) Salt & pepper noise; (f) Rotation and scaling back; (g) Scaling;
(h) Shearing; (i) Cropping; (j) Global bending with factor 10; (k) high-frequency
bending (factor 1); (l) Random jittering.
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Figure 5.8: (a) PSNR and SSIM versus α, where LW = 25; (b) BER versus α
under common attacks.
Chapter 6
Post-processing Operation For
Filtering
In the previous chapter, a histogram based image watermarking method is pro-
posed, which outperforms the recent histogram based image watermarking meth-
ods. It is worth noting that signal processing attacks and interpolation errors
caused by geometric attacks can aﬀect the performance of histogram based meth-
ods. Since the method in [49] does not consider these impacts, it is sensitive to
many attacks. In [50], histogram is combined with spatial feature regions but this
combination brings other issues. First, instability is induced due to insuﬃcient
robustness and accuracy of spatial feature regions, which does not exist in meth-
ods using histogram only. Second, the lack of adequate pixels in one single feature
region makes the method vulnerable to attacks. In [48], a post-processing step
is applied to tackle this problem. The implementation of this step is to build up
a buﬀer between the neighboring bins, where the buﬀer width is one gray level.
This step has two major problems. One of them is that when the bin width is
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smaller than three gray levels, it cannot work at all since there is no room to
build up the buﬀer. Another one is that under Gaussian ﬁltering, a considerable
amount of pixels’ values can be aﬀected by more than one gray level. Therefore the
negative impact on watermark decoding caused by pre-ﬁltering is not eﬀectively
handled in [48]. As a result, this method cannot guarantee 100% detection rate
even when attacks are absent. In the method proposed in the previous chapter,
a low-pass pre-ﬁltering step is also utilized. Although the side eﬀect of the pre-
ﬁltering has been reduced by the watermark embedding algorithm, there is still
room to improve. In this chapter, we introduce a novel HFCM step to compensate
the side eﬀect of Gaussian ﬁltering during the watermark embedding stage for the
histogram based image watermarking methods, which can further enhance the ro-
bustness. The concept of HFCM is illustrated by implementing it on the method
proposed in the previous chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First the idea of HFCM
is explained. After that, the simulation results are provided to show the superior
performance of HFCM, in terms of robustness against common attacks. The selec-
tion of parameter of HFCM is also discussed with the simulation results. Finally,
concluding remarks are presented.
6.1 Performance Enhancement Via HFCM
We ﬁrst discuss the necessity of HFCM. Recalling from the previous chapter, the
host image I is ﬁrst pre-processed a 2-D Gaussian low-pass ﬁlter
F(x, y, σ) =
1
2πσ2
e−
x2+y2
2σ2 (6.1)
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where (x, y) denotes the position of the pixel and σ is the standard deviation of
the distribution, which is chosen as σ = 1 in the previous chapter. The ﬁltered
image Ilow can be expressed as
Ilow(x, y) = F(x, y, σ) ∗ I(x, y). (6.2)
The high-frequency component Ihigh follows
Ihigh(x, y) = I(x, y)− Ilow(x, y). (6.3)
Denoting the watermarked low-frequency component without using HFCM by I˜Wlow,
the corresponding watermarked image can be obtained as I˜W = I˜Wlow+ Ihigh, where
Ihigh is the high-frequency component of the host image I. Let I˜
′ be the received
image at the watermark decoding stage. Clearly, in the absence of attacks, we
have I˜′ = I˜W . Since watermarks are hidden in the low-frequency component of I˜′,
the 7× 7 Gaussian mask F used at the watermark embedding stage is applied to
the received image I˜′ to extract its low-frequency component I˜′low. Thus we obtain
I˜′low = F ∗ I˜′
= F ∗ I˜W
= F ∗ (I˜Wlow + Ihigh). (6.4)
To correctly extract the embedded watermarks from I˜′low, the ideal case should
be I˜′low = I˜
W
low. Otherwise, detection error may occur, even if attacks are absent.
Unfortunately, from (6.4), it is obvious that I˜′low is generally quite diﬀerent from
I˜Wlow, which is a side eﬀect of Gaussian ﬁltering. To correctly extract the embedded
watermarks, Ihigh needs to be properly modiﬁed to compensate the side eﬀect
of Gaussian ﬁltering such that the watermarked low-frequency component at the
embedding end equals its counterpart at the decoding end. Speciﬁcally, after a
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pixel in Ilow is altered due to watermark embedding, the corresponding pixel in
Ihigh will be modiﬁed by the HFCM procedure presented below.
Prior to modifying Ihigh, it is important to ﬁnd the relationship between Ihigh and
Ilow. For the 7×7 Gaussian mask F, its (i, j)th element is F(i, j, 1). To save space,
we relabel F(i, j, 1) as Fij, as shown in Fig. 6.1. Assume that the Gaussian mask
F is applied to the host image I, centered at pixel I44 (see Fig. 6.2). Then the
low-frequency component I44 low of I44 can be calculated as
I44 low =
7∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
IijFij (6.5)
which can be further written as
I44 low = Q44 + I44F44 (6.6)
where
Q44 =
7∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
IijFij − I44F44. (6.7)
As mentioned before, watermarks are embedded into Ilow by modifying the gray
level values of some of its pixels and only one pixel will be modiﬁed each time.
Assuming that the pixel to be modiﬁed is I44 and the other pixels do not change
in the meantime, then Q44 will be a constant. From (6.6), it results in
I44 =
I44 low −Q44
F44
. (6.8)
Since I44 = I44 low+I44 high, it follows from (6.8) that the high-frequency component
I44 high can be expressed as
I44 high = I44 − I44 low
=
I44 low(1− F44)−Q44
F44
. (6.9)
CHAPTER 6. POST-PROCESSING OPERATION FOR FILTERING 122
&ϭϭ &ϭϮ &ϭϯ &ϭϰ &ϭϱ &ϭϲ &ϭϳ
&Ϯϭ &ϮϮ &Ϯϯ &Ϯϰ &Ϯϱ &Ϯϲ &Ϯϳ
&ϯϭ &ϯϮ &ϯϯ &ϯϰ &ϯϱ &ϯϲ &ϯϳ
&ϰϭ &ϰϮ &ϰϯ &ϰϰ &ϰϱ &ϰϲ &ϰϳ
&ϱϭ &ϱϮ &ϱϯ &ϱϰ &ϱϱ &ϱϲ &ϱϳ
&ϲϭ &ϲϮ &ϲϯ &ϲϰ &ϲϱ &ϲϲ &ϲϳ
&ϳϭ &ϳϮ &ϳϯ &ϳϰ &ϳϱ &ϳϲ &ϳϳ
Figure 6.1: Illustration of a 7× 7 Gaussian mask.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of Gaussian ﬁltering.
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In (6.9) we derived the relationship between Ihigh and Ilow. By using this relation-
ship, we can calculate the desired high-frequency component from the watermarked
low-frequency component. Given that I44 low is modiﬁed by an amount ξ due to
watermark embedding, the watermarked low-frequency component IW44 low can be
expressed as
IW44 low = I44 low + ξ. (6.10)
Now, we show how to modify I44 high according to the change of I44 low. Recall
that the received image I′ is the same as the watermarked image IW . Then, for
the received image I′, it follows from (6.9) that
I′44 high =
I′44 low(1− F44)−Q44
F44
. (6.11)
Also, to cancel the side eﬀect of Gaussian ﬁltering, we should ensure IW44 low =
I′44 low. Thus, from (6.10), it leads to
I′44 low = I44 low + ξ. (6.12)
Substituting (6.12) into (6.11), we obtain the desired high-frequency component
I′44 high as follows
I′44 high =
(I44 low + ξ)(1− F44)−Q44
F44
. (6.13)
As described before, in order to make I′44 low = I
W
44 low, we have to modify I44 high
to its desired counterpart I′44 high. Based on (6.9) and (6.13), the modiﬁcation
amount is
ΔI44 high = I
′
44 high − I44 high
=
(1− F44)ξ
F44
. (6.14)
Next, we show that changing I44 will also aﬀect the low-frequency components of
neighboring pixels at the receiver end. Since a Gaussian mask is concentrated on
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the central part and degrades signiﬁcantly towards the edges, we only consider the
neighboring pixels I33, I34, I35, I43, I45, I53, I54 and I55. Furthermore, because of
the circular and symmetrical property of Gaussian distribution, the impact on I34,
I43, I45 and I54 will be the same. Similarly, the impact on I33, I35, I53 and I55 will
also be the same. So, in the following, we only analyze the case of I54 and I55. For
I54, similar to (6.5), we can write I54 low as
I54 low =
7∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
Ii(j+1)Fij. (6.15)
Clearly, one term on the right-hand side of the above equation is related to I44. If
I44 is altered, I54 low will be aﬀected. Denoting
Q34 =
7∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
Ii(j+1)Fij − I44F34 (6.16)
it follows from (6.8), (6.15) and (6.16) that
I54 low = Q34 + I44F34
= Q34 +
(I44 low −Q44)F34
F44
. (6.17)
At the decoding end, according to (6.17), the low-frequency component of the pixel
I′54, denoted as I
′
54 low, can be expressed as
I′54 low = Q34 +
(I′44 low −Q44)F34
F44
. (6.18)
From (6.12) and (6.18), it yields
I′54 low = Q34 +
(I44 low + ξ −Q44)F34
F44
. (6.19)
Based on (6.17) and (6.19), we have
ΔI54 low = I
′
54 low − I54 low
=
F34ξ
F44
. (6.20)
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Referring to (6.14), we can further develop (6.20) into
ΔI54 low = F34ξ + F34ΔI44 high (6.21)
which is the amount of variation of I54 low caused by modifying I44 and Gaussian
ﬁltering. Similarly, the variation amount of I55 low can be expressed as
ΔI55 low = F33ξ + F33ΔI44 high. (6.22)
The above HFCM procedure can be applied to other pixels in the same way.
Note that changing the high-frequency component of I44 will aﬀect the neighboring
pixels and degrade perceptual quality. So, in practice, we introduce a parameter
β to control the strength of HFCM, i.e., replace ΔI44 high with β ·ΔI44 high. The
selection of β will be discussed later.
It is also worth noting that the embedding capacity of a watermarking method
using histogram depends on the number of gray levels employed in a bin. The
fewer gray levels used in a bin, the higher embedding capacity, and vice versa.
Since the proposed HFCM step does not impose any restriction on the bin size,
the minimum number of gray levels in each bin is 1. In contrast, to tackle the
problem caused by pre-ﬁltering, the methods in [48] and [50] require 3 gray levels
in each bin. For the method in [49], it needs at least 2 gray levels in each bin.
Hence, the proposed HFCM step can also help to improve the embedding capacity.
Remark 5: Although the standard invertible transform domains, such as the widely
used DWT, are applicable to embedding watermarks, most of them are not invari-
ant to geometric attacks [134], [135]. While certain transform domains such as
Fourier-Mellin transform and log-polar domain are invariant to aﬃne transforms,
they are not robust to other geometric attacks like RBAs, which are mainly consid-
ered in the previous chapter. On the contrary, Gaussian ﬁlter is rotation invariant
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due to its isotropic and circular shape [55]. This property is beneﬁcial for obtain-
ing geometric invariant feature points [57]. Therefore, it is worthy and necessary
to discuss how to reduce the side eﬀect of the Gaussian pre-ﬁltering.
6.2 Simulation results
In this section, we implement HFCM on the histogram based image watermarking
method proposed in the previous chapter. To evaluate the perceptual quality
and robustness of the proposed method, we compare the simulation results with
the methods in [48]-[50]. Similar to the previous chapter, the same ten standard
8-bit gray scale images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce,
Peppers, Pirate and Venice are used as host images in the simulations, which are
shown in Fig. 6.3. The same two diﬀerent embedding rates are used: i) The
number of watermark bits is LW = 25. ii) The number of watermark bits is
LW = LG. The PSNR index and the SSIM index are picked as the perceptual
quality metrics. Robustness is measured by the BER index. The attacks use for
robustness evaluation are same as chapter 5, where are absence of attacks, median
ﬁltering, JPEG, Gaussian noise, salt & pepper noise, rotation, scaling, shearing,
cropping, and random bending. The performance indices PSNR, SSIM and BER
are calculated by averaging the results obtained from the ten images.
6.2.1 Parameters of the proposed method
As in chapter 5, we set S = 246 and LB = 3. Regarding the parameter β, we here
empirically investigate their inﬂuence on perceptual quality and robustness using
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(a) Barbara (b) Calculator (c) Conch
(d) Desk (e) Elaine
(f) Lena (g) Office (h) Peppers
(i) Pirate (j) Venice
Figure 6.3: Original images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce,
Peppers, Pirate and Venice.
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(k) Watermarked
Barbara
(l) Watermarked
Calculator
(m) Watermarked
Conch
(n) Watermarked
Desk
(o) Watermarked
Elaine
(p) Watermarked
Lena
(q) Watermarked
Office
(r) Watermarked
Peppers
(s) Watermarked
Pirate
(t) Watermarked
Venice
Figure 6.4: Watermarked counterparts of images Barbara, Calculator, Conch,
Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce, Peppers, Pirate and Venice, where β = 0.2 and
LW = LG.
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the afore-mentioned host images, which will facilitate the selection of β.
Fig. 6.6 shows the impact of β on perceptual quality and robustness, where
LW = LG and α = 0.15. As shown in Fig. 6.6(a), the rise of β makes both
PSNR and SSIM decrease. This is not surprising as larger β means stronger
HFCM, equivalently more changes on the high-frequency components of pixels.
This degrades perceptual quality. On the other hand, we can see from Fig. 6.6(b)
that when β ≤ 0.2, increases β reduces BER and the reduction of BER is more
signiﬁcant when an attack (e.g., Gaussian noise attack in this case) is presented.
However, after β exceeds 0.2, the further surge of β returns larger BER. This in-
teresting phenomenon can be explained as follows. Assume that HFCM is applied
to the (i, j)th pixel of the host image and changes the value of this pixel in the
embedding process. When performing Gaussian ﬁltering on the received image
in the decoding process, it could alter the values of the pixels surrounding the
(i, j)th pixel. The lager β value, the more likely the values of these pixels will be
changed. When this happens, BER starts to increase. Therefore, to balance per-
ceptual quality and robustness, β can be empirically chosen from the range [0, 0.2].
In the remaining simulations, we considered three β values: 0 (e.g., HFCM is not
activated), 0.1 and 0.2.
Table 6.1: PSNRs and SSIMs of the proposed method versus β, where LW = 25
and LW = LG, respectively.
Perceptual quality
LW = 25 LW = LG
β = 0 β = 0.1 β = 0.2 β = 0 β = 0.1 β = 0.2
PSNR (dB) 51.83 47.04 45.54 51.14 46.64 45.13
SSIM 0.982 0.962 0.952 0.981 0.958 0.947
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Table 6.2: BERs of the proposed method versus β and the methods in [48]-[50]
under common attacks, where LW = 25.
Attacks
Proposed method Method Method Method
β = 0 β = 0.1 β = 0.2 in [48] in [49] in [50]
Closed-loop 0.006 0.004 0 0.050 0 0.074
Median ﬁltering 0.056 0.035 0.016 0.091 0 0.118
JPEG 10% 0.201 0.146 0.112 0.212 0.490 0.245
JPEG 30% 0.007 0.005 0 0.061 0.485 0.199
Gaussian noise 0.027 0.008 0.001 0.071 0.473 0.146
Salt & pepper noise 0.006 0.004 0 0.050 0 0.074
Rotation 10◦ 0.025 0.014 0.003 0.075 0.267 0.228
Rotation 25◦ 0.033 0.020 0.005 0.083 0.307 0.230
Scaling 80% 0.028 0.015 0.007 0.073 0.283 0.234
Scaling 120% 0.027 0.011 0 0.060 0.240 0.204
Shearing 10% 0.024 0.020 0.004 0.064 0.039 0.206
Cropping 10% 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.060 0 0.053
Cropping 20% 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.138 0 0.073
Cropping 30% 0.019 0.011 0.006 0.142 0 0.076
Global bending 0.025 0.011 0.001 0.071 0.056 0.197
high-frequency bending 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.050 0 0.083
Jittering 1% 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.053 0 0.076
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6.2.2 Perceptual Quality
Table 6.1 shows the PSNRs and SSIMs of the proposed watermarking method
under diﬀerent β and LW . As expected, raising β degrades perceptual quality.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we take PSNR of 40 dB and SSIM value of
0.9 as the indicators of good perceptual quality. Since the PSNRs (resp. SSIMs)
obtained by our method are well above 40 dB (resp. 0.9), the watermarked images
will be of good quality. For example, 6.4 shows the watermarked counterparts of
the images Barbara, Calculator, Conch, Desk, Elaine, Lena, Oﬃce, Peppers, Pirate
and Venice by our method, where LW = LG and β = 0.2 (which yield a PSNR
of 45.13 dB and an SSIM of 0.947, as show in Table 6.1). Clearly, there is no
visual diﬀerence between the original images and their watermarked versions. For
the illustration purpose, in Fig. 6.5 we enlarge the original image Lena from Fig.
6.3 and its watermarked counterpart Fig. 6.4 to demonstrate the good perceptual
quality of our proposed method.
6.2.3 Robustness
Table 6.2 shows the BERs of the four watermarking methods against common
attacks, where each image is embedded LW = 25 watermark bits. We make the
compared methods have very close perceptual quality but our method has slightly
higher perceptual quality than the other methods. For example, in the case of
β = 0.2, the PSNR and SSIM indices of the proposed method are (PSNR =
45.54 dB, SSIM = 0.952), while those of the methods in [48]-[50] are (PSNR =
44.26 dB, SSIM = 0.932), (PSNR = 44.59 dB, SSIM = 0.938) and (PSNR =
43.75 dB, SSIM = 0.937), respectively. This ensures that the comparison is fair.
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Since the comparison between the proposed method without HFCM and the meth-
ods in [48]-[50] has been done in the previous chapter, here we mainly focus on
the impact of β on the robustness. From Table 6.2, we can see that as β increas-
ing, the robustness of the proposed method improves dramatically. This is not
surprising because we have theoretically analyzed that the introduction of HFCM
can improve robustness.
Table 6.3 shows the BERs of the four methods when the number of watermark
bits embedded into an image is increased to LW = LG. Again, all four methods
have almost the same perceptual quality but the perceptual quality of the proposed
method is slightly higher than that of the other methods. From Table 6.3, it can be
seen that when HFCM is enabled, the robustness of the proposed method improves
signiﬁcantly. When β = 0.2, the proposed method outperforms the methods in
[48]-[50] by large margins.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
Many image watermarking methods suﬀer from the side eﬀect of pre-ﬁltering. In
this chapter, we propose a novel HFCM scheme to compensate the side eﬀect of
Gaussian pre-ﬁltering during the watermark embedding stage for the histogram
based image watermarking methods. The ﬁltering process is revealed and the im-
pact of watermark embedding is investigated. The HFCM is design based on the
theoretical analysis. A parameter is proposed to control the strength and perfor-
mance of HFCM and the selection of the parameter is discussed. The superior
robustness enhancement performance of the HFCM is demonstrated by simulation
results.
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Table 6.3: BERs of the proposed method versus β and the methods in [48]-[50]
under common attacks, where LW = LG.
Attacks
Proposed method Method Method Method
β = 0 β = 0.1 β = 0.2 in [48] in [49] in [50]
Closed-loop 0.020 0.009 0.006 0.066 0 0.081
Median ﬁltering 0.099 0.059 0.032 0.112 0 0.121
JPEG 10% 0.236 0.176 0.113 0.244 0.493 0.251
JPEG 30% 0.033 0.015 0.012 0.082 0.496 0.232
Gaussian noise 0.058 0.020 0.011 0.096 0.476 0.189
Salt & pepper noise 0.023 0.008 0.004 0.066 0 0.086
Rotation 10◦ 0.071 0.031 0.021 0.091 0.268 0.237
Rotation 25◦ 0.073 0.035 0.025 0.106 0.310 0.251
Scaling 80% 0.066 0.032 0.023 0.093 0.297 0.249
Scaling 120% 0.065 0.031 0.013 0.080 0.241 0.226
Shearing 10% 0.059 0.024 0.010 0.084 0.062 0.242
Cropping 10% 0.029 0.013 0.004 0.080 0 0.073
Cropping 20% 0.036 0.017 0.005 0.160 0 0.083
Cropping 30% 0.048 0.024 0.010 0.162 0 0.083
Global bending 0.061 0.029 0.014 0.091 0.071 0.227
high-frequency bending 0.035 0.015 0.007 0.069 0 0.087
Jittering 1% 0.031 0.012 0.007 0.068 0 0.086
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;ďͿtĂƚĞƌŵĂƌŬĞĚ
Figure 6.5: Enlarged original image Lena and its watermarked counterpart.
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Figure 6.6: Impact of β on perceptual quality and robustness, where LW = LG
and α = 0.15. (a) PSNR and SSIM versus β; (b) BER versus β under closed-loop
and Gaussian noise (variance 10) attacks.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we have presented a novel rank based image watermarking method
and improved moment based and histogram based image watermarking methods.
A HFCM step is also proposed to compensate the side eﬀect of commonly used
Gaussian pre-ﬁltering. Along with this is a detailed performance comparison of
the proposed methods with suitable existing image watermarking methods.
In chapter 2 we discuss the necessity of digital copy protection from the economic
point of view and the fundamental concepts of digital image watermarking. Be-
sides, we also reviewed and analyzed classical image watermarking methods and
identiﬁed the limitations of those methods.
In chapter 3 we present a novel rank base method for image watermarking. The
host image is segmented into blocks and watermark embedding process is imple-
mented in DCT domain. Watermark bits are inserted into an image block by
modifying the set of DCT coeﬃcients using a rank base embedding rule and an
error buﬀer is introduced. In the watermark detection process, the corresponding
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detection matrices are formed from the received image using the secret key. Af-
terwards, the watermark bits are extracted by checking the ranks of the detection
matrices. The proposed method is HSI free and robust to various attacks, which
is shown by theoretical analysis and experimental results.
In chapter 4 we propose a moment based method to tackle the challenging crop-
ping attack, as well as signal processing attacks and other geometric attacks. In
the proposed method, the PPVD is ﬁrstly extracted based on the spatial statistics
of the host image. Then a PPVD image is constructed for watermark embed-
ding. The geometric moment invariants are calculated from the PPVD image and
modiﬁed to a predeﬁned value to carry the watermark bit. Since PPVD is insensi-
tive to cropping, the proposed method achieves good resistance against cropping.
Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed method.
Chapter 5 proposes a novel image watermarking method to deal with the chal-
lenging cropping attack and RBAs, as well as other common attacks. During
the watermark embedding, a Gaussian pre-ﬁltering is ﬁrstly applied to extract the
low-frequency robust to signal processing attacks. Then a histogram-shape-related
index is introduced to choose the pixel groups with the highest number of pixels
and a safe band is built between the chosen and non-chosen pixel groups, which
make the proposed method robust to various attacks. By using the same secret
key as the embedding step, the watermarked pixels groups can be identiﬁed and
watermarks can be extracted. Superior performance of the proposed algorithm is
compared with recent histogram base image watermarking methods.
Chapter 6 introduces a post-processing step (HFCM) to compensate the side eﬀect
of the commonly used Gaussian pre-ﬁltering. First the side eﬀect of Gaussian
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pre-ﬁltering is analyzed by theory. Then the mechanism of HFCM is explained
theoretically and the proper strength of HFCM is suggested. We also implement
HFCM on the proposed histogram based method and compared with the proposed
method without HFCM and recent histogram based methods. The improvement
introduced by HFCM is shown by experimental results.
The rank based method proposed in Chapter 3 has high embedding capacity, but
it is not robust to geometric attacks. The moment based method and histogram
based method proposed in Chapters 4 and Chapter 5 respectively are robust to
geometric attacks, but their key spaces are limited. If somehow the three meth-
ods can be combined to simultaneously achieve high robustness against geometric
attacks and high embedding capacity, it will be a signiﬁcant advance in image wa-
termarking area. One of the possible ways to achieve this is to choose two batches
of DCT coeﬃcients and embed watermarks based on the diﬀerence between the
moment values or histogram shapes of the two batches. This approach can be
explored in future research.
7.1 Future Research
There is a considerable scope for further theoretical and practical investigation of
image watermarking. The following areas regarding image watermarking methods
can be focused on:
• Investigation of human visual system (HVS) sensitivity to modiﬁcations.
Development of a perceptual model to adaptively suggest the suitable pixels
or coeﬃcients for watermark embedding and the appropriate strength of
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the watermark to make the watermarked image imperceptible to HVS. The
perceptual modal should also automatically synchronized at the detection
step to make the watermarking method blind.
• Synchronization for transform domain based methods between watermark
encoder and decoder. The watermarking method developed in chapter 3 is
robust, imperceptible and secure. However, the segmentation should be per-
fectly synchronized between watermark encoder and decoder for successful
watermark extraction, which can be easily disturbed by geometric attacks.
• Improvement of the embedding capacity for image watermarking methods
robust to geometric attacks. The proposed moment based and histogram
based methods are robust to both signal processing attacks and geometric
attacks, but their embedding capacities are limited.
• The three proposed watermarking methods as well as many other water-
marking methods cannot survive multiple watermark embedding. Making
them resistant to multiple watermark embedding is a meaningful research
direction in the future.
• A comprehensive theoretical analysis about the tradeoﬀs between robustness,
imperceptibility, security and embedding rate.
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